# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 541st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As members are aware, today is International Women's Day, which is celebrated worldwide every year. The Conference on Disarmament has for some time now had occasion to join in commemorating this important event by receiving the views and concerns of organizations representing women all over the world. Today it is our pleasure to have with us the participants in the Women's Meeting for International Women's Day which is being held in the Palais des Nations. I should like to extend to them, as well as to all women involved in the work of the Conference, our congratulations on their special day, which has such great significance. The participants in the Women's Meeting have addressed a message to the Conference, which will be read out by the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the information of the members and for the records of the Conference. I invite Ambassador Komatina to take the floor.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message, as you said, is addressed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

"We are more than 90 women from 19 countries who have gathered here to mark International Women's Day and to promote equality, peace, and general and complete disarmament including a world without nuclear arms.

"The theme of our first meeting of this decade is the health, genetic and environmental consequences of nuclear radiation from weapons production and testing. As women, we are deeply alarmed by the growing evidence of human suffering and ecological destruction caused by nuclear activities world-wide. The available evidence has convinced us that a death process in the species has begun. We would be happy to make available to the members of the Conference written and visual material presented at our meeting.

"In recent months, the political climate in Europe has substantially changed, reinforcing the negotiations for the reductions of conventional forces on the continent. This easing of tensions and the process of conventional disarmament needs to be extended to all regions of the world.

"We welcome the progress achieved on a convention banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. While we recognize the complexity of the negotiations, we are aware of the continuing danger that chemical weapons may be used in regional conflicts. We urge the Conference to increase its efforts to overcome the remaining obstacles and conclude the treaty by the end of this year.

"A comprehensive test-ban treaty is a vital first step towards ending the nuclear arms race and proceeding with disarmament. As long as testing and weapons production continue, the significance of disarmament agreements such as the INF Treaty could be reduced to a minor notation in the history of an unrelenting arms race. Therefore, we urge you to

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establish an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a view to the negotiation of a treaty and, furthermore, to establish an ad hoc committee to address the question of the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament.

"We will continue to follow the work of the Conference on Disarmament with deep interest. We assure you of our support for all your efforts and wish you every success."

Here ends the message.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference for reading out the message addressed to us by the Women's Meeting for International Women's Day. On behalf of the Conference, I thank the participants in that Meeting for the message they have addressed to us on important questions relating to disarmament. I wish also to extend to them our best wishes for the successful conclusion of their deliberations.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, we are to take up for decision today a request by a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. I should also like to inform you that the consultations relating to the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", have been successfully concluded. I intend, therefore, to put today before the Conference for adoption a draft decision relating to this question, as well as the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. In order to do so, we shall follow the usual procedure - that is, I will convene an informal meeting of the Conference once we reach the end of the list of speakers. We shall subsequently resume the plenary meeting to formalize the decisions considered at the informal meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): It is a great honour for me and my country to speak in the presence of the women who have gathered in Geneva to mark International Women's Day and to observe th work of the Conference on Disarmament. I have listened attentively to the message addressed to us, as just read out by the Secretary-General of the Conference. The concern for the effects of nuclear testing is shared by Sweden. The demand for a complete ban on nuclear testing has been actively pursued over the years by prominent women representing the Swedish Government - Alva Myrdal, Inga Thorsson and Maj Britt Theorin. In spite of all the efforts made by Sweden and many other States, and in spite of the fact that the test ban issue is the first item on

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the agenda of this Conference, there are still, much to our regret, no negotiations going on in this forum on what ought to be the top priority of its work. However, 1990 is a crucial year, and I can assure you that the Swedish delegation, for its part, will spare no effort to assist in getting substantive work on a nuclear test ban started without further delay. In these efforts it is essential to build on broad international opinion, as expressed not only by overwhelming majorities in the United Nations General Assembly, but also by a dedicated and well-informed public opinion behind Governments. Non-governmental organizations also play a vital role of their own in this context. Many of the questions we deal with in this Conference are essential for the future of humanity. Your presence and your message today testify to your active engagement in these questions and to the important contributions which are being made by women's organizations all over the world.

According to the work programme of the Conference, this week should be devoted to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and this will be the subject of my intervention today. However, before addressing this subject I should like to express the great satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, Sir, presiding over the Conference. Sweden and Nigeria, both members of the Group of 21, have co-operated very closely on many issues over the years. Against this background, and in view of your personal and professional qualifications, I know that the Conference is in very good hands. I am sure that you will guide us in a very effective manner during the month of March. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the excellent way in which he carried out his duties during the month of February. Thanks to his personal endeavours a number of difficult issues were resolved at the outset of this year's session.

More than three decades have elapsed since the beginning of the space era. Nearly 4,000 satellites have since then been launched into orbit. Many States have considerable space programmes and have made heavy investments in peaceful space activities. Only a few, however, have the financial and technological basis for the entire spectrum of space technology, including launching capabilities.

Satellites are likely to become less expensive in the future, as will civilian space services. Sophisticated multi-purpose satellites will probably become less frequent and give way to satellites designed for more limited tasks. Such satellites can be launched by relatively small rockets, at least into low Earth orbits.

Almost all functions performed and services offered by space technology deal with information transmission. Space technology is in fact one of the cornerstones of today's information society. Virtually all States are making substantial use of space programmes in one way or another, especially with regard to communications.

Some of the satellites which play an essential role in verifying disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and other surveillance satellites in low Earth orbit, which can be important for stability, may already be threatened by existing anti-satellite techniques. For example, communication

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and early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit - which are even more crucial to stability - will, as a result of technological developments, get within closer reach as potential targets for military attacks.

These developments give rise to serious concern. In my intervention before the Conference on Disarmament on 11 July last year I touched upon the new emphasis apparently being given to anti-satellite programmes. This new emphasis may be attributed to the fact that a major increase has occurred in the number and capabilities of several categories of military satellites. Moreover, a "diffusion" of military space functions seems to be taking place from the strategic down to the tactical level.

The distinction between anti-satellite weapons and strategic defence weapons may not be very clear in some cases. Not only would a ballistic missile defence system be destabilizing: spin-offs of investments originally made for ballistic missile defence purposes could also introduce incentives for new ASAT ventures that would fuel an arms race in outer space.

Since some ASAT systems can have dual ASAT and ABM capabilities, and vice versa, another disturbing phenomenon is that the testing of ASAT weapons could be interpreted as testing of ABM weapons, running counter to the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Technological developments may also allow for a horizontal spread of ASAT capabilities, as pointed out by the then representative of Sri Lanka to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Rodrigo, in a statement in this Conference on 22 June last year. He stated:

> "If the current space Powers do not support a multilateral process for preventing the weaponization of space, the entire existing space system, which is said to provide strategic stability, could with the inevitable proliferation of military space technology, become a soft strategic target."

Since 1985, when the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, it has carried out useful work in scrutinizing relevant agreements, identifying pertinent issues and elaborating concrete proposals. It has by now been clearly demonstrated through this work that existing international law is insufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. The protection offered by the current international agreements is not only insufficient; it will increasingly diminish in the face of rapid changes brought about by emerging technologies.

We must not put ourselves in a situation where we will have to address the necessity of negotiating disarmament agreements pertaining to outer space. We are all too well acquainted with the difficulties in trying to reverse a process which has already been supported by heavy political and financial investment. There is therefore an urgent need for the international community to take effective measures to prevent outer space from becoming a new arena for the arms race and thereby also a potential battlefield of the future.

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The overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations General Assembly have repeatedly urged the Conference on Disarmament to establish a more operative mandate than hitherto for its Ad hoc Committee on this issue. Regrettably, neither the United Nations resolutions nor the reiterated calls by the Group of 21 to this effect have as yet gained the full support of the Conference. The lessening of tension in international affairs should permit a new approach also for this crucial global task before us. An arms race in outer space would negatively affect all States.

My delegation has identified certain measures that, as a first step, should promote crisis stability and strengthen international security. First of all we have proposed that negotiations should start in the Conference on Disarmament on a ban on what are known as dedicated anti-satellite systems. Such a ban was the subject of bilateral talks between the two major space Powers some years ago. As a matter of fact, a de facto moratorium on ASAT testing has been in existence for some years now.

A more challenging task is to come to grips with the many non-dedicated capabilities that can be used for ASAT functions. The Swedish delegation has recommended that agreements be negotiated to ban the testing of such types of devices in an anti-satellite mode. Such a functional approach has a precedent in the ABM Treaty, which refers to testing "in an ABM mode". This would help solve the great difficulty of covering a wide range of techniques which, although not originally designed for ASAT functions, could be modified for such purposes without great difficulty.

The fact that my delegation attaches the highest priority to concrete measures to prevent an arms race in outer space does not imply that we dismiss the relevance of measures to promote increased transparency and confidence-building in space activities. An ASAT ban naturally does not exclude the need for "rules of the road" and other confidence-building measures. We are in fact carefully studying such proposals that have recently been made in the Conference on Disarmament. These proposals deserve to be further discussed in the Ad hoc Committee.

Just to briefly touch upon some of the concepts in this context, I wish to refer to the various ideas that have been put forward concerning immunity for satellites, including the possibility of extending the immunity of the space segment of a satellite to include a certain area surrounding it. Some of these ideas raise questions of principle in international law and may affect provisions in existing treaties. According to the outer space Treaty, outer space "shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination". No "creeping jurisdiction" can be accepted in this regard. In our view, however, an anti-satellite test ban appears to be the most effective method to render protection to satellites. Such a ban would well serve international stability and security. The need for increased transparency regarding satellite activities could be met, for instance, by better use and strengthening of the registration Convention.

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It goes without saying that agreements on measures to prevent an arms race in outer space will have to be supported by stringent verification régimes. Concrete work on verification should therefore start in the Conference on Disarmament. Ambassador Reese of Australia touched upon this in a statement to the plenary of the Conference on 23 March 1989, where he stated:

> "Technology is now sufficiently advanced to provide reasonable assurances that bilateral arms control agreements can be effectively verified. The availability to multinational bodies of strategically significant technologies such as space-based remote sensing of spacecraft or of the Earth has also become a reality. The examination of evolving verification technologies and how they could be put to good use in issues related to arms control in outer space is therefore another area which warrants serious examination by our Ad hoc Committee."

At last year's summer session scientific and technical experts from Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic made interesting contributions with regard to verification questions. Such expert input contributes to the advancement of the work of the Ad hoc Committee.

By addressing concrete issues connected with an international régime to prevent an arms race in outer space we choose not to resign ourselves to becoming the passive spectators of uncontrolled development powered by its own dynamics, but to engage in the forward-looking pursuit of common security and a safer international environment for all.

Many of the techniques that may be of interest for confidence-building régimes could perhaps also be relevant for verification of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. I shall therefore briefly deal with some methods which may be considered for observation and verification tasks - such as observation of satellite orbits or of a satellite's payload and its functions - and which may be of pertinence to different space-related activities.

The fact that the orbiting of satellites is governed by the simple law of dynamics makes observation of satellite movements comparatively uncomplicated. Although orbits may be altered by on-board rockets, for instance, this is an energy-demanding and slow process.

Simple radar systems for acquisition of orbital parameters of satellites in low Earth orbits are moderately costly. For geostationary orbits, on the other hand, radar systems need both considerably larger antennas and very strong transmitting power, which obviously increases complexity and costs.

Until now radar systems have had very limited capacity for imaging or for identifying small structural/geometrical details, which has led to consideration of verification concepts based on satellite-borne instead of ground-based sensors. However, with synthetic aperture radars (SAR), which use a microwave imaging technique for moving sensor platforms, radar systems are acquiring improved capabilities. Multistatic systems with one transmitter and several receivers permit imaging of details far beyond the resolution

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given by the radar antenna itself. If data acquisition is carried out over an extended time during a satellite's passage, more advanced data for identification are attainable even for ground-based radar systems.

As to other available technical means of observation and verification, mention could be made of the tagging of satellites. Tags could, for example, be integrated with beacons or navigation systems so that through satellite communication channels an observing ground station could acquire information concerning the satellite's whereabouts.

I also wish to refer to the interesting idea of a multilateral trajectography centre, presented in the plenary on 18 July last year by Ambassador Morel of France, and further developed by his delegation in the Ad hoc Committee. It presents challenges to both computer systems and system security. Such a body should aim at providing maximum openness. The idea should in the view of my delegation be the subject of further technical discussions.

Since ordinary tracking techniques intended for the tracking of a State's national satellites are generally not adequate for verification of orbital data for satellites belonging to other States, a world-wide network of observation stations, based on radars and optical telescopes, could be established. In this way, States could be efficiently alerted when satellites are not following certain "rules of the road", as well as when larger space debris is on a collision course with satellites. With approximately 7,000 objects in space today, roughly three quarters of which are some kind of space debris, the need for tackling this problem is apparent.

The establishment of an international space surveillance agency could be instrumental in verifying compliance with treaties relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A global verification system would also have to take into account other means of verification, such as pre-launch inspections to determine the function of a spacecraft, tagging and sealing devices, satellite-borne sensors and other techniques. My delegation would welcome a continuation of the deliberations on these issues, which should be as well structured as possible. We need to establish which verification methods will best serve the task of supporting measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

At a later stage in this year's session my delegation intends to revert in more detail, and on a technical level, to verification questions which arise in this context.

Let me conclude by underlining the need to arrive at a comprehensive and solid international order to prevent an arms race in outer space. Potentially dangerous developments are always easier to stem as long as they remain mere possibilities. There can be no doubt that it will be considerably less difficult for this Conference to negotiate multilateral agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space than to seek to reverse an uncontrolled process in a couple of years' time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): May I, at the beginning of my statement, welcome the 90 ladies from 19 countries who are here on the occasion of International Women's Day, and may I express to you, Mr. President, my happiness that you are guiding our deliberations here in your experienced and kind way? I might also add my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, who did a wonderful job last month in helping us to come to conclusions where we might not have hoped to have the opportunity.

Mr. President, in my statement last month I referred to the historical changes that are taking place in Europe. Artificial barriers dividing Europe are being overcome and Europeans are on the road to co-operative stability, seeking to attain security not by confrontation but by collaboration. These changes are reflected in the negotiations on conventional arms control and on confidence-building and security-building measures in Vienna. The participants in those negotiations are confident that agreements on both subjects can be signed in the course of this year, possibly at a CSCE summit. We also expect an "open skies" treaty to be ready by the end of the second part of the conference to be held from 23 April to 15 May in Budapest.

Maybe the sense of urgency and resolve prevailing in those forums will prove contagious. There is no reason why we should not set ourselves equally ambitious goals for the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time - as happened to the dinosaurs, you may remember. We all know that the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely conclusion of our task of drafting a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons exist. Firstly, the Paris Conference held at the beginning of last year definitely made the elimination of existing chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities, and the prohibition of any further manufacture, acquisition, storage, transfer or use of chemical weapons, a common cause of the whole international community. All States participating in that Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues with a view to concluding the convention at the earliest date. In addition, the world chemical industry strongly endorsed our negotiations at the instigation of the Australian Government at the Canberra Conference last year. Secondly, in terms of material preparation for an early convention, the Conference on Disarmament has over the last few years been engaged in particularly intensive negotiations covering all aspects. So the opportunity must be seized. The outstanding problems need to be addressed resolutely. Solutions to the key issues which have been under discussion for so long cannot be put off time after time.

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Allow me, therefore, to address one of those issues which is of truly crucial importance: challenge inspections. It has been under intensive discussion for almost three years now, so far without a solution. I am convinced that a solution to this problem would not only remove one of the main obstacles in the way of completing the verification system, but would also provide a strong stimulus to tackle the other as yet unresolved issues of the convention.

There seems to be agreement that challenge inspections are indispensable and a corner-stone of the whole verification system, since they constitute an all-embracing measure enabling all States parties, on an entirely equal basis, to clarify doubts about the compliance of others. Despite this basic common understanding, and despite all the efforts undertaken over the past years within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, divergences of view seem to persist.

Following consultations conducted last year and earlier by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee, it seems to me that we have in some respects got bogged down. Divergences seem to have been unduly politicized. They have also gradually grown out of proportion. If we continue in this way we may thwart a solution which is both realistic and meets the requirements of effective verification.

What is needed now is a fresh look at the issues of challenge inspection - a look unclouded by some of our past discussions. The point of departure should be a consideration of the technical nature and the basic political characteristics of challenge inspections. Here some agreement seems to exist - as reflected in such catchwords as challenge inspection as a means to clarify doubts about compliance; the right of each State party to request a challenge inspection any time, anywhere; no refusal of the request; the right and obligation of the requested State party to demonstrate compliance; inspection to be carried out in accordance with the request in the least intrusive manner possible; the right of the requesting State party to observe the inspection; and the right of the inspected State party to protect sensitive equipment or information as far as possible. If there is agreement on these points, why is it not possible to include provisions to that effect in the "rolling text"?

Whenever technical aspects are accompanied by political and psychological sensitivities, our Conference starts to stall. Some say they want the philosophy of a subject to be clarified. Others insist that only the wording - even the final wording - should be at the centre of our deliberations. And in the process we lose the opportunity to take the necessary political decisions. This is the case with regard to challenge inspection too. The question is simply whether this verification method should be a factor of normal life or confrontational in nature. In considering this the following aspects should, in my view, be borne in mind. Firstly, challenge inspections are designed to be implemented on a regular basis, like other verification measures under the convention, but they are triggered by doubts about compliance. Secondly, at the same time, challenge inspections, like all other on-sit inspections, are intended to provide an assurance of compliance by not relying solely on declarations or assurances by State parties but by checking on the spot. In this regard all inspection

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measures are of the same routine nature. Thirdly, challenge inspections may indeed be considered confrontational as they might imply an allegation of non-compliance. However, all inspections are in a way accusatory, as they can be interpreted as indicating disbelief in declarations made by States parties. Fourthly, the nature of challenge inspections is a matter of perception. Perceptions, as we all know, may differ between individuals. In any event challenge inspections must be considered a right and be accepted as an integral and indispensable element of the verification system. Finally, verification is intended to build confidence. Thus challenge inspections must also be perceived as a legitimate means to this end.

In considering and evaluating the elements I have just enumerated, one might wonder whether indeed the word "challenge" is consistent with the nature of the inspections in question, or whether it should not be replaced by a more neutral term like "inspections on request". A corresponding proposal has - as you will remember - already been made in this room.

I have dwelt on the "routine versus confrontational" issue in order to show that a problem-oriented approach may be helpful in settling some of the long-standing moot points in our discussion. I have raised this problem in order to prevent a situation where, in a field of truly multilateral interest, a field where serious multilateral disarmament is possible and achievable, we are outdistanced by bilateral solutions which, while welcome, raise the question of the capacity of this Conference to achieve the goals for which it was constituted.

Let me now address another facet which has gained significance in the discussion: the question of whether challenge inspections are primarily a bilateral or a multilateral instrument. On this issue especially it seems to me that realism and a sense of proportion are required. Otherwise we may get enveloped in futile "ideological" debate.

Challenge inspections should be considered multilateral, as they are part of a multilateral convention guaranteeing equal rights to each of its parties. Compliance is a concern of all parties. In their implementation, challenge inspections are bilateral, in so far as they are triggered by a request from an individual State party for inspections on the territory of another State party. This seems to be a legitimate procedure, as each State party should be able to seek reassurance if it has doubts about the compliance of another State party. If each State has the right to obtain this reassurance by requesting challenge inspections, this enhances confidence in the convention and is thus beneficial to the multilateral convention régime as a whole.

The "multilateral versus bilateral" issue has been at the heart of the discussions on procedures following submission of the report on the result of a challenge inspection. Diverging views have been expressed on the roles of the Executive Council and the requesting and requested State party with regard to the evaluation of the results of a challenge inspection. In dealing with this issue two basic considerations should be borne in mind. First, it seems unrealistic to assume that the Executive Council, a truly political body consisting of representatives of sovereign States, can be prevented from discussing the report of a challenge inspection communicated to it and

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expressing its own opinion on whether or not the requested State is in compliance. Second, the requesting State or any other State cannot be prevented from drawing its own conclusions and taking those measures it considers necessary to maintain its national security, even if its assessment is not shared by the Executive Council. No individual State can be bound by decisions or measures adopted by the Executive Council which it perceives as jeopardizing its national security.

For me the following questions result from these basic considerations: Does the "bilateral versus multilateral" distinction have practical implications for the challenge inspection régime? If so, in what way would it have to be taken into account? Do possible actions of the executive Council or the requesting or requested States parties have to be prescribed or described in the convention? In cases of non-compliance, what is the difference in post-inspection procedures between routine and challenge inspections? Bearing these questions in mind, I wonder whether the issue cannot adequately be covered by the provisions on the political organs of the Organization as set forth in article VIII of the convention.

Let me in conclusion address another very important point concerning the challenge inspections régime - the question of protecting sensitive installations. This question has been widely discussed, and a number of provisions to this end have already been elaborated. I would just like to recall in this regard the provisions contained in the protocol on inspection procedures under the heading "Managed access".

It is on this point in particular that we were able to record a lot of progress last year. However, I recognize that the issue is a very delicate one, in particular since challenge inspections, as they are discussed in the framework of our negotiations, are very broad in scope and have no precedent in the history of arms control and disarmament. I also recognize that a merely conceptual discussion of the implications of the intrusiveness of challenge inspections and possible precautions and measures to protect sensitive information is not enough. The problem cannot be dealt with in the abstract. Rather, practical experience is needed.

To gain such experience we - like others - are currently undertaking a series of trial challenge inspections in military facilities. I am pleased to introduce today the report on our first trial challenge inspection in a military facility. The report has been distributed as an official document of the Conference today. Its results suggest that at facilities like the ammunition depot chosen for our first trial, an effective challenge inspection might be possible without sensitive information having to be disclosed. It was encouraging to see that what we have termed in our report "secondary indicators" may in certain cases do a lot to dispel doubts about compliance.

We would welcome a discussion on our findings within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. And I am confident that such a discussion will contribute to the further clarification of the as yet unclear concepts of alternative measures and managed access. The question of whether and, if so, how alternative measures would differ from managed access has stimulated considerable discussion. It remains to be answered convincingly. In my view

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we should discuss whether the notion of alternative measures is not outdated, and whether the concerns underlying this concept are not already covered by measures designed to protect sensitive equipment and information and, in particular, by what is now understood as constituting managed access.

At the end of last year we conducted another trial challenge inspection, which focused in particular on the methods and equipment needed in a challenge inspection. I hope soon to be able to provide a report on this trial inspection as well. We have planned further trial challenge inspections in order to gain a better insight into the possibilities of protecting sensitive installations, and also with a view to answering the question of the role of the observer of the requesting State party and to what extent he should have access to the inspection site.

We are looking forward to an in-depth discussion of the problem of challenge inspections. We hope that this issue will be discussed matter-of-factly, with determination and realism. We should in all frankness explain our positions and also address those aspects which may pose difficulties. A problem-oriented, unbiased approach seems to me to be best at this juncture. In concluding my statement today I wish to take this opportunity to pledge my delegation's full support for this year's Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius. I am confident that with his experience and diplomatic skills he can lead the way, togehter with his dedicated collaborators and his able working group chairmen, Mr. Lamazière, Mr. Meerburg and Dr. Krutzsch, to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am sure that our Conference will fare well under your dynamic leadership. We fell confident having you as our President. The importance that Nigeria attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament was clearly brought out once again by the statement of His Excellency the Minister of External Affairs of Nigeria on 1 March. In passing, I would also like to thank you very much for the kind words you spoke on that same day - 1 March - about the period during which I had the honour and privilege to serve the Conference as its President during the month of February.

I would like to make a short statement on behalf of the Western Group. I welcome the presence here of so many participants in the Women's Meeting for International Women's Day. We listened with great interest to the message addressed to the CD. Once more it was brought out that our Conference does not work in a vacuum - we are not a world in itself; we serve the world. We are aware of the expectations of the world community, and I would like to bring out our awareness of the recent changes in the world, the many positive changes in all parts of the world and also in Europe after the revolutionary year 1989, which adds to the topical relevance of our work in the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, the Western Group attaches high priority to the early

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conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, and it is well known that we need to spare no effort and spare no energy to arrive at the early introduction of a truly global verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I need not underscore the great importance of nuclear items, and this body devotes considerable attention to them. At the same time, we are aware of the considerable progress in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which could well result soon in considerable reductions in their nuclear arsenals. I can assure our visitors today that we feel encouraged by their presence here. Their message delivered to us today constitutes a new and fresh element for our consideration.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Serguei Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I would like to associate myself with the words of congratulation and welcome on the occasion of 8 March addressed by those who have spoken here today before me to the representatives of the better half of the human race present among us. May that better half always inspire us in our tenacious efforts to prevent war and to reduce the burden of armaments, as well as in other areas. We listened with great attention to the message addressed to the Conference on Disarmament by a number of women's organizations and read out by our Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, and we feel that it is a very important statement.

Mr. President, since this is my first statement in March, I would like to congratulate you as your take up your important post and assure you that the Soviet delegation will provide you with full support and co-operation. I also feel that I must express our gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers, who guided the Conference through its work in February. Under his energetic and tactful leadership we managed to resolve a number of important matters, thus opening the way to a rapid commencement of work on the substance of the issues which we have on the agenda, in particular the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is this specific topic, or rather one of the concrete aspects of it, to which I wish to devote my statement today.

By agreement with the head of the United States delegation, Ambassador S. Ledogar, I am hereby providing information on the fourteenth round of the Soviet-American consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which are being held in accordance with a decision adopted at the Geneva meeting of the leaders of the two countries in November 1985. The fourteenth round of bilateral consultations began on 20 February and is coming to an end today, 8 March. The round was preceded by a meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, J. Baker, from 7 to 9 February in Moscow. At that meeting they adopted a joint statement on chemical weapons which contained an agreed overall framework for achieving the aim of eliminating chemical weapons world wide - an aim which the USSR and the United States consider as one of the most urgent tasks. In this connection, I would like to recall that the documents issuing from the Moscow meetings of the ministers

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

relating to arms limitation and disarmament issues, including the chemical weapons issue, and the papers on the chemical weapons ban emanating from the Wyoming ministerial meeting in September 1989, have been distributed at the request of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament with the symbols CD/973 and CD/974.

In accordance with the instructions given by the ministers at their Moscow meeting, the delegations at the round continued work on a bilateral agreement on the reciprocal obligations of the USSR and the United States pending the international convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. It is planned that an agreement of this nature will be signed in June 1990 at a summit meeting. Both parties expressed the hope that such an agreement will confirm the commitment of the USSR and the United States to move towards the achievement of a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The agreement under preparation is intended to speed up the elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world, and will also help to accumulate a certain level of practical experience in implementing chemical disarmament.

The parties firmly hold the position that the discharge of obligations under the bilateral agreement will not be a pre-condition for, and will not jeopardize, the conclusion and implementation of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons.

In the fourteenth round good progress was achieved in the elaboration of the text of the future agreement, although there are a number of problems still to be discussed. The participants examined questions connected with the implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to prohibition of chemical weapons. Agreement was reached between the parties on an exchange of seven visits to three categories of facilities (chemical weapons storage facilities, production facilities and industrial chemical enterprises) under phase I of the arrangements agreed in the memorandum. It was agreed that the first exchange of visits will involve visits to chemical weapons storage facilities at the beginning of June this year. The delegations to the round practically completed the elaboration of the programmes and other details for the visits to specific categories of facilities. During the visits the parties plan to discuss in detail the applicability of the procedures agreed at the multilateral negotiations to the specific facilities which will be visited.

In pursuance of the agreement reached at the ministers' meetings in Wyoming and Moscow, the delegations started discussing matters of co-operation between the USSR and the United States on technology and procedures for safe and expeditious as well as economically and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons. Highly qualified experts from both sides took part in these discussions. Agreement was reached on an exchange of visits to appropriate facilities in the USSR and the United States.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The United States and the Soviet Union are conducting bilateral discussions on the prohibition of chemical weapons with the intention of helping to achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations. Delegations at the round of talks discussed certain technical aspects related to matters still awaiting solution in the draft convention on the chemical weapons ban. In the multilateral negotiations the USSR and the United States have submitted proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. The parties reaffirmed their intention of working to speed up the multilateral negotiations in order to resolve the basic pending issues and complete the elaboration of the draft convention as soon as possible. The next round of bilateral consultations is scheduled for April this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, I feel honoured to be able to congratulate you today on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. My delegation is convinced that under your direction we will make headway in tackling and negotiating the important issues on our agenda - the more so because your diplomatic skill, great political experience and devotion to the cause of peace, international security and disarmament make you capable and well qualified to fill this high post in our unique multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. My delegation pledges to do its utmost to assist you in discharging your responsible duties as President of the Conference. At the same time my delegation highly appreciates the outstanding performance of last month's President, the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers, who ensured a good and effective start to our deliberations during the first month of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament this year.

The Secretary of State of my country, Hungary, made a comprehensive statement in our Conference on our disarmament policy just recently. In my brief statement today I should like to associate myself with your congratulations addressed to the participants in the public gallery on the occasion of international Women's Day. My delegation acknowledges with thanks the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, on the same occasion. I am very pleased to see the festive flowers on your table, and I am happy also to have listened to the welcoming works by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, and those of Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands and Mr. Batsanov of the Soviet Union addressed to the representatives of the non-governmental organizations and women's organizations honouring our conference and manifesting a vivid interest in our work. In acknowledgement of all these tributes my delegation feels honoured to wish all women participants and our honourable guests in the gallery today - as I do on behalf of my Eastern European friends too - the best of luck, happiness and success in their family life, work and social activities. I reiterate also with renewed hope my delegation's efforts to continue to work in this

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

distinguished Conference in concert with every delegation to attain our common goals - a world without arms and fear, progressing uninterruptedly with the elaboration of effective international agreements banning chemical weapons and contributing to disarmament in other fields as well. I am happy to observe among the reasons why the present international conditions are propitious for positive developments the negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the two super-Powers, leading hopefully towards nuclear disarmament, the European conventional force reduction talks, the fading away of the numerous hotbeds of war in the world, the Eastern European spring in democracy, their striving for sweeping political, economic and social reforms, and so on. I am confident that our negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament will help to create favourable conditions for a more peaceful world, in justice and security for the betterment and benefit of mankind.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): As I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, Sir, I should like to congratulate you and pledge the fullest co-operation of the delegation of Peru in your important task. I should also like to wish you every success. I am taking the floor not to refer to any of our agenda items but to follow a Latin American tradition of chivalry and congratulate all the ladies present here on International Women's day, and in particular the Women's Meeting for International Women's Day. In this I fully agree with Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union that women are the better half of humanity and a source of inspiration towards men, except in the production of armaments.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words extended to women. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

As agreed at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference, in five minutes' time, to consider some organizational questions.

The meeting was suspended at 11.20 a.m. and resumed at 11.35 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 541st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I should now like to formalize the agreements that we have reached at our informal meeting today. I put first before the Conference for decision the note by the President circulated by the secretariat as document CD/WP.382, concerning a request from a non-member State to participate in our work. I suggest that we now adopt the relevant decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the action that we have just taken, I wish to note that the statement made by my predecessor at the resumed 534th plenary meeting of the Conference also applies to the request that we have considered today.

I should like now to turn to the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The draft mandate for the Ad hoc Committee has been circulated by the secretariat in document CD/WP.378. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish now to put before you the appointment of Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus on this appointment.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish, on behalf of the Conference to extend our congratulations to Ambassador Shannon on this important appointment. I should also like to ask the deputy representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson, to transmit to Ambassador Shannon our best wishes for success in discharging the responsibilities which will face him as presiding officer of the subsidiary body.

I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga, who will speak in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for agenda item 5.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to express our sincere pleasure at seeing you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. Your recognized qualities as a diplomat, your vast experience and your ability guarantee the best possible development of the work of the Conference under your skilful guidance. I should also like to emphasize that relations between Nigeria and Venezuela have always been characterized by friendship, co-operation and solidarity. We would also like to express our gratitude and at the same time our congratulations to Ambassador Wagenmakers for the effective and productive way in which he guided the work of the Conference during the month of February. I should also like to stress that relations between the Netherlands and Venezuela are extensive and significant. Finally, I would also like to express my gratitude for the kind words of welcome that you have addressed to me on the occassion of my joining the Conference on Disarmament.

I am now going to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21, on the adoption of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I shall read this statement in English.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

(continued in English)

The General Assembly on 15 December 1989 yet again, with an overwhelming majority and with only one dissenting vote, adopted resolution 44/112 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to intensify its consideration of that question, in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals and initiatives. The resolution further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1990 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

The Group of 21 is fully committed to the provisions of this resolution. It considers its adoption as yet another expression of strong support to entrust the Ad hoc Committee with an improved mandate in conformity with the responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has, over the past few years, already examined and identified the need to reinforce the legal régime applicable to outer space, as well as the need for strict compliance with existing agreements. It has also considered further measures and the need to hold appropriate international negotiations in accordance with the spirit of the outer space Treaty. In this context the Group of 21 wishes to recall the large number of proposals from all groups introduced in the Conference on Disarmament since the inception of the work of its Ad hoc Committee in 1985.

While continuing to underline the importance of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and the urgency of preventing an arms race from taking place in outer space, the Group of 21 considers that it has now become necessary to improve the mandate and the organization of work of the Committee so as to make explicit the consideration of proposals for the identification of concrete measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

Faced once again with a rigid position within the Western Group, the Group of 21 regrets that it has not been possible to improve the mandate. In view of the urgent need to address, without delay, the important question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which requires the prompt re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, the Group of 21 has decided, once again, to demonstrate further good will and flexibility in agreeing to work on the basis of the mandate of the previous years. The Group of 21 recalls that the mandate covers the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group of 21 is of the opinion that the Ad hoc Committee should therefore start work immediately, in order to achieve progress and achieve positive results, and expects substantial movement on the mandate issue next year, in keeping with the importance of the subject within the global disarmament agenda.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

(continued in Spanish)

This is the text of the Group of 21's statement, which I wish to convey to the Conference. I should also like on behalf of the Group of 21 to express our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Shannon of Canada on his election as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5. We are sure that Ambassador Shannon will skilfully guide the work of the Ad hoc Committee and will work resolutely towards the achievement of constructive results that we are all interested in. Ambassador Shannon can count on the full co-operation of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Morel of France, who will speak in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the Western Group.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Before I speak on behalf of the Group of Western Countries, allow me, Sir, since I am taking the floor for the first time this month, to congratulate you on taking up the post of President and say how pleased we are to see you guiding our work with competence, efficiency, benevolence and even, as you showed us this morning, humour. Nor can I refrain from recalling that this month of Nigerian presidency is starting just after the visit to France by the President of the Republic of Nigeria, which was an enormous success and demonstrated our excellent relations once again. Allow me also to extend my congratulations and thanks to Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for the remarkable way in which he presided over the Conference in February, securing from us collectively through his actions the adoption of important decisions which, I believe, consolidate the spirit in which we work.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Western Countries, I would like to express our satisfaction at the fact that the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has been re-established for this session, with a mandate adopted in the same conditions as in the last session. We believe that the sterile pursuit of a procedural debate leads only to a waste of valuable time which we wish to devote totally to the Ad hoc Committee's substantive work. Moreover, we are convinced - and experience last session provided ample proof of this - that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee adopted by the Conference is sufficiently clear, broad and flexible to allow all interested delegations to contribute in a constructive way to reading our common goal, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As in the past, the Western Group intends to play an active part in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. It addresses its warmest congratulations to Ambassador Shannon of Canada on his election to the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee. It is proud to see a very competent representative, from a country very committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking up this senior post. It assures him of its full support in his important task and is ready to get down as soon as possible, under his leadership, to the specific details of the organization of the Ad hoc Committee's session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, as I am speaking in the plenary for the first time this month, I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the month of March. We are convinced that under your outstanding guidance the Conference will continue to achieve new progress, and we would like to thank the Ambassador of the Netherlands for his outstanding work and contribution during his presidency in the month of February. Under your guidance, Sir, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has been formally re-established, and this is another step forward in a short period of time. For this reason I would like to congratulate you and other delegations. I would also like to congratulate the Ambassador of Canada on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I hope that under his Chairmanship new progress will be made on the important issue of the Prevention of an arms race in outer space. China's principled position on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is well known, and I will not repeat it. At the same we express our support for the Group of 21's positive position of principle on this issue. We appreciate the constructive efforts made by the Group of 21 to ensure an early start to the work of the Ad hoc Committee. The Chinese delegation will, as always, continue to co-operate in a meaningful way with you, Mr. President, as well as with the Group of 21 and other delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Mr. Erendo.

Mr. ERENDO (Mongolia): I think my Ambassador, when he speaks in the plenary, will more officially congratulate you on taking up the presidency for this month. Nevertheless, I would like to join the previous speakers in congratulating you on taking up this important position, and to pledge the co-operation of our delegation.

As item co-ordinator of our Group, my delegation would like to express satisfaction at the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space. At the same time I would also like to express the appreciation of our Group to the Group of 21 for their spirit of co-operation and compromise, which made possible the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I would also like to recall that we in our Group also hoped that the mandate could be improved in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of the last three years, but it proved to be impossible to improve the mandate this year. We hope that next year we will have an opportunity to look into this matter more profoundly and be able to improve the mandate in accordance with the expressed will embodied in the General Assembly resolutions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): Mr. President, on behalf of Ambassador Shannon, I would like to thank you and the other members of the Conference on Disarmament for your kind messages and congratulations. I shall convey these to him. Ambassador Shannon regrets that, because he has been called to meetings this week in Ottawa, he was not able to be with us today. He will, however, be returning this weekend and I am confident that he will prove to be an active hands-on Chairman, who will use his very best endeavours to ensure that the work of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space is productive and useful.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if the need arises. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 13 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.542
13 March 1990

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesady, 13 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

GE.90-60337/1664B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 542nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United State of America and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation and I personally would like to join with those who have already congratulated you upon your assumption of the presidency during the second month of the Conference on Disarmament's 1990 session. Under your guidance, we have already established the Ad hoc Committee for outer space, an important achievement in the eyes of my Government, and admitted several non-member participants to the CD. The United States delegation would like to assure you of its support and co-operation in the challenges we face during this month. I would also like to congratulate Ambasador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, as others have done, for his superior leadership and achievements during his February presidency of this distinguished body.

Two weeks ago, I had occasion to address the Conference on chemical weapons. Chemical weapons is not my main topic this morning, but I would like to underscore the thrust of Minister Batsanov's statement last Thursday. My Government is pleased with the productive nature of the CW United States-Soviet bilateral round just completed. Our joint progress in reaching a bilateral agreement on destruction of chemical weapons stocks can only further efforts in this body to finish drafting a multilateral CW convention at the earliest date.

Chemical weapons are high on the United States Government's arms control agenda. Let me turn to the subject of nuclear weapons, another item on this agenda. We start from the fact that for more than 40 years, a strong nuclear deterrent has been necessary to ensure the security of the United States. It has helped preserve the security and freedom of our allies and friends. The long European peace of the last 45 years has, I believe, led to the situation we have today, in which the winds of freedom are sweeping through so many countries. The long period of stability has purchased time in which our attention could turn from survival to human and political rights.

Nuclear deterrence remains a critical component of United States security strategy. As Secretary of State Baker said to the Supreme Soviet last month, as long as we must rely on nuclear weapons to secure peace by deterring aggression, we will need a safe, reliable and modern stockpile. That means we will continue to need to conduct some underground nuclear tests.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The United States adheres to a step-by-step process towards further limits on nuclear testing. We remain committed to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal. However, as Under-Secretary Karhilo of Finland astutely observed in his speech here on 20 February, there is no short-cut to a CTB. It must be built as you would build a bridge across a chasm, laying plank by plank on a solid foundation so that it will remain strong and reliable for generations.

The United States seeks a CTB in the context of a time when we do not have to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities and greater balance in conventional forces.

Let me pause here for a moment to focus on the question of verification. A CTB without adequate verification is not a treaty; it is a temptation. Much work remains to be done to develop a credible system for verifying compliance with a CTB in spite of the popular belief that the technology is available now. The United States for its part, continues to support the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and will fully participate in its Second Technical Test. We are deeply disappointed that so many States, including some that regularly call for a CTB, have not seen fit to take part in this important experiment.

The United States is grateful for the efforts of Ambassador Donawaki of Japan and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, to find a consensus on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda. Let me be clear. The United States and the Western Group are willing to re-establish an ad hoc committee and have been since 1984. For two years, we have been ready to set aside our own proposed mandate text in order to work towards consensus on the basis of the compromise text drafted by Ambassador Vejvoda. The United States is still willing to do that. We are puzzled that others are unwilling to do the same. None the less, the United States has been actively pursuing reductions of nuclear arms in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. I believe an objective observer must be pleased - and heartened - by the progress we have made. The INF Treaty has been in place for more than 20 months. At the February United States-Soviet Ministerial in Moscow, major steps were taken in negotiations on reducing strategic weapons, and our nuclear testing delegations are working diligently to complete the protocols for the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties in time for signature at the summit this coming June.

Times are changing, more hopefully perhaps than at any time in history. But change is inevitably a time of uncertainty, turmoil, and fear as well as of hope. The challenge for all of us is to see that these changes continue peacefully and positively. It is no time to abandon the structures that have brought us this far.

On 5 March, the President of the United States issued a statement in recognition of the 20th anniversary of one of the principal foundations of international security today - the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Later

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

this year the parties to the NPT will hold its fourth review conference. In the context of that review, President Bush reaffirmed "the determination of the United States to carry out its treaty commitments and to work to assure its continuance in the interest of world peace and security". I have asked the secretariat to circulate the President's statement as a CD document.

Our Conference also has an agenda item on the question of "negative security assurances", the provision of assurances from the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The United States had publicly stated that:

> "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

We stand by this assurance as a firm and reliable statement of United States policy. We have, nevertheless, willingly participated in the CD's efforts to develop effective arrangements and, more specifically, in the search for a common formula acceptable to all. Agreement to date on effective arrangements has been elusive because specific security concerns of all the individual participants are involved - nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We are ready and willing to contribute constructively to these efforts again this year, and I pledge the support and co-operation of my delegation to our distinguished Italian colleague, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso, who serves as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

Since 1985, the Conference has considered, in successive ad hoc committees, questions related to the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The United States has conducted its own examination of possible measures that might be feasible and desirable to serve as the basis for possible negotiations on further multilateral arms control agreements that apply to outer space. To date, my Government has yet to see any proposals from others that we believe are feasible, desirable, and verifiable. And we ourselves have not identified any such appropriate measures to propose. We offer our support and co-operation to my distinguished colleage Ambassador Shannon of Canada in his chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee established last week, and we are prepared to consider any proposal that emerges there. But we are not able to accept calls for multilateral negotiations in this area.

My delegation is pleased that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has met. We pledge our co-operation to Ambassador Varga of Hungary in his progress in the Committee, and hope that somehow we might be able to move negotiations forward on at least the "traditional" subject. On the question of prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities, my delegation is not convinced of the need for additional measures in this area, and we continue to oppose any linkage of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities with a radiological weapons ban.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

I have yet to address questions relating to agenda items on "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We remain of the view, that the prevention of a nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general. The real question at issue is how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. In this regard, nuclear war cannot be isolated from the problem of the prevention of all war. Therefore, the United States cannot join consensus on establishing an ad hoc committee on this item.

Finally, I would like to add a personal word about this Conference. I refer to the thoughtful statement offered several weeks ago by my distinguished Brazilian colleague, Ambassador de Azambuja, in which he suggested that we examine ways to make the CD more relevant to the real world. I completely agree with this suggestion. The epochal changes taking place in Europe, and the resulting amelioration of East-West tensions, is shifting the focus of arms control to problem areas that have long festered in the shadows. Such problems will likely comprise the coming agenda of this Conference. Some members of this forum, unfortunately, seem to view it primarily as a political forum in which to preach to the nuclear Powers, especially the super-Powers, about nuclear issues. For too long we have listened to sanctimonious speeches which appealed to sentiment rather than taking account of realities, for example by urging that nuclear weapons somehow be disinvented. And for too long we have heard nuclear deterrence derided by some who have benefited from the period of peace it made possible. For years we have lived with non-negotiable agenda items such as Prevention of nuclear war, Cessation of the nuclear arms race, and Comprehensive programme of disarmament, which have not really served the negotiating process, but have been used instead to make political points. Moreover, the process has been reinforced through the device of voting General Assembly resolutions on matters critical to the United States and other nations, and then quoting them in this forum as if they were holy writ. The effect has been to undermine the CD's mandate as a genuine arms control negotiating forum - the one broad international arms control body that has a chance to achieve real results rather than political posturing, because it works by consensus.

The United States has worked in good faith to make the CD a viable institution. We have sought to make arms control work, to establish principles and reach agreements that would improve the security of everyone. We have also learned our limits: for instance, we have found that setting examples which we are assured others will follow often results in pressure for more examples, with little attention to whether anyone has followed the original example. When we unilaterally declared our CW stocks, only the USSR followed our example. We are still waiting for other declarations. This atmosphere is not helpful to the CD's objectives, and it makes it harder for my country to place its full confidence in this Organization's work.

The record shows that this forum operates at its best when its members identify common arms control interests, and then proceed on the basis of consensus to reach agreements of usefulness to all. It is this objective

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

which we should seek to widen in the new era which faces us. There is much to be done. We could, for instance, explore the possibility of taking up regional security questions and regional arms races, and we could examine conventional arms imbalances outside of Europe. We could consider the costly burden placed on limited economies by the need to procure high-tech, super-sophisticated weapons systems. It seems to me that many of the "real world" problems alluded to by Ambassador de Azambuja relate to these areas. They could be the basis for realistic and meaningful additions to our negotiating agenda.

These are some of the ideas that have occured to me as I reflected on the thoughtful questions raised by my distinguished Brazilian colleague. In closing, let me say again that the United States will continue to pursue vigorously the conclusion of disarmament agreements that enhance the security of all members of the community of nations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mr. Abdul-Aziz Omar.

Mr. OMAR (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (translated from Arabic): I am happy and honoured to address this august Conference for the first time. Allow me, Sir, to express our congratulations to you on taking up the presidency of this Conference for this month. We are sure that your wide experience will be of the greatest assistance in the attainment of excellent results. I wish to express our gratitude and appreciation for the endeavours of your predecessor, the Ambassador of the Netherlands, who guided the work of this Conference during the month of February. I would like also to express our appreciation to you and to all the members of the Conference who responded positively to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's request to participate as an observer in the plenary meetings of the Conference and its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Although our participation last year was limited owing to our limited experience in the field, we intend to develop our participation in the future in co-operation with the developing countries, in order to make it more effective. I am happy to be addressing the body which was assigned by the General Assembly to consider the question of disarmament referred to in paragraph 1 of article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations. This question relates closely to the purposes of the United Nations, particularly the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations. If these purposes are achieved in the manner envisioned, they will provide all nations, and particularly the nations of the third world, with real opportunities for economic and social progress and development.

(Mr. Omar, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed its overall views on the question of disarmament in the statement delivered by the Secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation before the Paris Conference in January 1989. He said:

> "Complete and comprehensive disarmament under effective international control is the ultimate aim which the peoples of the world are pursuing. All States, and particularly those which possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, have the obligation to strive resolutely and diligently to achieve this objective while totally respecting the purposes and principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with the priorities defined in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, namely the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons and conventional weapons".

This comprehensive view, which is shared by many States, stems from a full awareness of the appalling dangers facing our planet as a result of the production, stockpiling and possible use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the scenes of mass destruction caused by atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan still haunt the minds of present-day generations. Thousands of persons are still suffering from their painful and lethal effects. Moreover, we are still suffering directly from the scourge of two world wars and their residual legacy in the shape of minefields laid by belligerent armies in our territory. My country was the first in the African continent and in the world as a whole to fall victim to the use of chemical weapons after the First World War. It is a proven historical fact that, on 31 July 1930, the Fascist colonial forces dropped 24 mustard gas bombs, weighing 21 kilograms each, over the peaceful oasis of Tazirbou in central Libya, thereby causing considerable loss of life among men, women and children.

My country has given practical expression to its awareness of this danger through its endeavours, within the international community and the United Nations system, to ensure the adoption of measures to speed up the process of comprehensive disarmament, to consolidate and maintain international peace and security. As part of these endeavours, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has acceded to the following international instruments: the partial test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Moreover, my country has worked for the conclusion, within IAEA, of a convention on the inspection of nuclear installations for peaceful purposes.

My country has followed with great interest the progress of negotiations on arms control and disarmament and is happy to note that these negotiations are being conducted actively at all bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. In the statement issued by the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation on 13 February 1990,

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my country welcomed the Soviet-United States statement issued in Moscow concerning the agreement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries on the need to eliminate chemical weapons throughout the world and their determination to work for the signature and application of a multilateral agreement prohibiting the production and use of chemical weapons and providing for the world-wide elimination of the stockpiles of such weapons. My country, having already expressed its hope that this agreement will be applied fully, and having reiterated its clear position in regard to these and other types of weapons of mass destruction, calls for the adoption of more far-reaching measures for the elimination of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons in order to protect mankind from their dangers and preclude any possibility of their use. This statement was issued as an official document of this Conference (CD/970) on 20 February 1990.

Moreover, in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Great Green Document on Human Rights, which was issued as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly under the symbol A/44/331 on 19 June 1989, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya adopted the following principles regarding the arms trade, the cessation of arms production and atomic, biological and chemical weapons:

> "23. The members of the society of the Jamahiriya believe that peace among nations can bring about well-being, prosperity and concord, and they call for the abolition of the arms trade and an end to the manufacture of arms, since it represents a squandering of the wealth of the masses, constitutes a burden on individuals, because of taxation, and presents mankind with the spectre of mass destruction.
>
> "24. The members of the society of the Jamahiriya call for the abolition of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and means of mass destruction and for the destruction of existing stockpiles. They call for the release of mankind from atomic plants and the threat of nuclear waste."

My country is also following with you the sincere efforts aimed at the drafting and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

I do not believe, and nobody believes, that there is any ambiguity in the Libyan position regarding nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. However, all of you are aware of the White House announcement on 7 March that "available evidence suggests that chemical weapons are being produced at the Rabta plant in Libya", and that this called for international efforts to shut down the facility. "We are very seriously concerned about this development", said White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater in reference to the plant. He said the Rabta facility was dangerous and becoming more so. There was a necessity for heightened international vigilance of Libyan procurement activities and for vigorous efforts to stop the Rabta operation, he declared. He also said that the Administration had expressed its serious concern to various Governments, and that the international community should step up its efforts to deny Libya the ability to continue operating the plant. "This is a subject we have under

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continual discussion with our allies and others and we intend to press ahead with those discussions in the coming days". Answering questions, the spokesman said: "We certainly would urge all countries to survey their internal situation, inventory their chemical production facilities and make their own judgements that they are not a source for any of these chemicals". The spokesman urged his questioners to focus not on who was giving the Libyans the chemicals but rather on the Libyan leader and on the country that was producing chemical weapons. When he was asked to define what he meant by vigorous efforts to stop the operation, Mr. Fitzwater replied that he was not willing to speculate on specific efforts, but that nothing was ruled out.

Immediately after the White House announcement, the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation issued a statement in Tripoli which denied all these allegations and reaffirmed the full commitment of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to all international instruments and efforts aimed at the prohibition of the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and expressed Libyan readiness to co-operate with any constructive international efforts to that end. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has repeatedly explained to the whole world the nature of the Rabta plant. In its statement issued in document CD/970, Libya invited States and companies throughout the world which were concerned with the production of pharmaceuticals to participate with us in the production of medicines and medical equipment. In fact, Libya took a further step when the General People's Congress, on the conclusion of its sixteenth session on 9 March declared its support for any measures that might be adopted by the international community in regard to the verification and inspection of chemical weapons, provided that those measures were applied to all States. The same statement was also made by our Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York on 8 March.

As you are aware, this is not the first time that the United States Administration has made such allegations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Likewise, this is not the first time that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has denied these unfounded allegations by the United States Administration. However, the fact remains that these announcements and this intense propaganda campaign raise many questions concerning their nature and their real underlying motives.

I do not wish to prolong my statement. However, in view of our firm position to which I have already referred, I would like to question the reason why Libya has been singled out by the United States. The distinguished representative of the United States of America stated before this Conference, on 27 February 1990, that there are more than 20 States that have or are seeking chemical weapons. The question once again is: Why single out Libya? I would also ask him whether his list includes Israel. If so, could the United States Administration inform the Conference or international public opinion about the types of chemical weapons that Israel possesses or is producing, and whether the United States Administration dare say about Israel what it is alleging about Libya? The same questions can be raised regarding South Africa and its co-operation with Israel in this field. By what right does the United States Administration set itself up as prosecutor and judge

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while the international community is considering this matter? In fact, the United States Administration is seeking a pretext to commit yet another of its repeated acts of aggression against Libya. The United States declarations contain an open threat to use force against Libya, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. Such an act would have an adverse effect on the peace and security of the central Mediterranean region. The United States Administration seems fond of committing aggression against small peoples, as has happened in a number of cases, most recently in Panama. Such declarations also imply a hostile incitement to States not to deal with Libya, in an attempt to expand the scope of the economic embargo which the United States has imposed on Libya in total disregard of the obligations of the United States, as a major Power, to preserve international peace and security and to promote friendly relations among nations.

I urge the members of the Conference on Disarmament to show understanding for the Libyan position on this matter. I hope that the United States Administration will heed the rule of law and wisdom and resort to dialogue instead of provocation and the threat of force.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would simply like to state our regret at the Libyan choice of this forum to make its response to statements about Libyan chemical weapons capabilities that were made in Washington. The White House spokesman has commented on this matter in some detail; those comments were not made in the context of our negotiations here, but since the representative of Libya has raised them here this morning, I can only state that my authorities stand by those comments.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to recall that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will hold its opening meeting of the present annual session immediately after this plenary meeting, in this Council Chamber.

I have no other business for today, and I therefore intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 15 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.543
15 March 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

GE.90-60350/1689B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 543rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to two distinguished visitors who are addressing this plenary meeting. The Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Frances Wilde, is a Member of Parliament who has served in several important posts in that capacity, in particular as Government Whip. Since 1987, she has held several Cabinet posts, having been appointed to her present functions in 1989. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali-Akbar Velayati, has regularly followed our work, having addressed the Conference on Disarmament on eight occasions since his first visit on 16 February 1984, and having presided over it on 1 September 1988. I wish to thank both Ministers for their presence here today, and I am looking forward to hearing their statements.

I should like to recall that 28 years ago yesterday the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum started its work in a new political configuration. Since 14 March 1962, when the first plenary meeting was held at the Foreign Minister level, multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues have become a continuous and essential part of the search for international peace and security, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Several disarmament agreements have been concluded in this Council Chamber, all of them within the context of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Our Conference has not yet been able to achieve similar results. As we witness significant changes in international relations, in particular between the two military alliances, we shall intensify our efforts to lead our ongoing negotiations to successful results, as well as to explore every possibility offered by the agenda of the Conference and developments outside it to facilitate the identification of other areas where we can respond to the challenges of the present times by keeping up with the process of political change in those fields of specific responsibility for the Conference. I would venture to say that never since 1962 have we faced a situation so rich in opportunities for successful disarmament negotiations. But it is necessary for us to seize those opportunities and thus contribute to a qualitatively new stage in international relations.

I now continue with our business for today. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today Her Excellency the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Venezuela and Egypt. I now give the floor to Her Excellency the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Frances Wilde.

Ms. WILDE (New Zealand): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to address this body during the period of your presidency. New Zealand values closely its relationship with Nigeria, not least because of our Commonwealth ties. The New Zealand observer delegation assures you of its continued support and co-operation.

I am particularly pleased to be speaking to the Conference on Disarmament at this time. Here in Europe and elsewhere in the world it is a period of tremendous change. After many years of tension and confrontation it is inspiring to see so much progress towards democracy, human rights and economic freedoms. New Zealand, geographically, lies a long way from these developments. But we share in the surge of hope which these events bring to the business of arms control. For years we have talked about increasing security at lower levels of arms. Now it is within our grasp.

The shape of world politics is undergoing fundamental change. And as tensions reduce between East and West, security will be seen to rest less on the weapons of war, and more on the wise application of political, economic and particularly environmental measures. For the people of the South Pacific this holistic view of security is one which is perceived as critical for our future.

There has been dramatic progress in East/West arms control since my predecessor addressed you two years ago. At that time the focus of international attention was the INF Treaty. For the first time ever, nuclear-weapon States had agreed to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons. That treaty, in our view, was an acknowledgement - long overdue - that security is enhanced not by more weaponry but by less.

Today the aspirations are much greater. In Malta, the super-Powers held out the promise of a whole flush of disarmament agreements during 1990. The recent Moscow and Ottawa meetings have brought this tantalizingly close to reality. New Zealand commends the United States and the Soviet Union for the progress they have made in their START negotiations. The massive cuts proposed in START, when achieved, will be a momentous step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Equally important are the conventional force cuts and confidence-building measures being negotiated here in Europe. After 15 fruitless years of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, who could have foreseen the amazing progress made at Vienna during the last 12 months?

We have also been impressed by the "open skies" concept, which has been the subject of the recent Ottawa Conference. Transparency is of the essence of arms control. The concept of "open skies" goes to the heart of the question. It is not a new idea, being a legacy of the first super-Power summit, 35 years ago. New Zealand looks forward to other States embracing greater openness, including "open skies", as a means of building confidence.

Against this backdrop, I feel confident in saying that the Conference on Disarmament can afford to be more ambitious than in the past. If the Conference is to retain international credibility, it has no choice but to

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

exploit recent developments and produce concrete results. If it does not, the Conference runs the risk of becoming redundant. In the face of the new bilateral rapport, and the sweeping changes in Europe, it seems to us that the CD runs a very real risk of being outpaced by political events.

I say this notwithstanding the important work being done here on the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. New Zealand fully supports the work of the CD on chemical weapons. We pledge our support for, and co-operation with, the Ad hoc Committee in its work. The point I am making is that expectations have changed over the past few months. As Presidents Bush and Gorbachev have done with START and CFE, the CD needs to set a self-imposed deadline for the completion of a CW text. That would help ensure that the momentum generated by the Paris and Canberra conferences is not lost. It would demonstrate that the CD is able to adapt to the accelerating pace of change in world security affairs. It would put political pressure on all States to find solutions to outstanding problems - for who wants to be seen to be standing in the way of the convention?

Last year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Morel, the chemical weapons Ad hoc Committee made useful progress in redefining the "rolling text", and reconciling some of the outstanding differences. I refer in particular to the newly developed annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures, and the valuable work done by the Technical Group on Instrumentation.

The Instrumentation Group's report makes clear, once and for all, that the technical requirements of the convention's verification régime can be met by modern technology. Equally the protocol on inspection procedures reflects the considerable degree of consensus that exists on the requirements of an inspection régime.

I am heartened that verification difficulties at the technical level are now seen as problems to be solved, and not as convenient excuses to delay arms control. Such an approach augurs well for the resolution of more fundamental political issues. I am confident that under its new Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Committee will address these remaining differences in a constructive fashion.

The recent agreement by the super-Powers to proceed to substantially reduce their chemical weapon stocks provides further impetus for work here. Their decision to cease all chemical weapons production when the convention enters into force will have a very positive impact on the talks in the CD. However, New Zealand cannot support the super-Powers' decision to keep a residual stockpile of chemical weapons until all chemical-weapon-capable States adhere to the convention. We have very real concerns about the implications of this approach for an effective and all-embracing multilateral agreement.

There is growing awareness, in the South Pacific region, of the chemical weapons issues before this Conference. For this, and for its wider efforts in pursuit of chemical disarmament, New Zealand would like to take this opportunity to commend the Government of Australia.

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

In our view the regional seminar on chemical weapons and the Government-Industry Conference held in Australia last year were particularly useful initiatives. The Government-Industry Conference heard the first collective statement by the world's chemical industry giving a commitment to assist in bringing about a total chemical weapons ban.

We believe that finishing work on the "rolling text" on chemical weapons at this session is the CD's most pressing task if the Conference is to retain credibility.

Arms control in chemical weapons has also highlighted another problem: arms disposal. The destruction of chemical weapons is not easy. It is in everyone's interests that it be done in any environmentally safe manner. This issue is causing some anxiety to Pacific nations, which have long protested at the use of their region for nuclear weapons testing in which they want no part. Now countries of my region are watching carefully the proposals made for the destruction of chemical weapons there. Small Pacific islands may seem remote from the huge continents of the world but, together with the Pacific Ocean, they are the homes and life-support systems of the many peoples of the region. We do not want the delicate ecosystem damaged any further by new intrusions.

Despite the importance of chemical weapons, the focus of the Conference cannot remain that subject alone. The Conference's work on other areas must be advanced. I am particularly concerned at the prolonged inability of the Conference to agree on a mandate for a committee to debate item 1 - a nuclear test ban.

New Zealand's commitment to a ban on all testing, by all States, in all environments, and for all time, is well known. It is shared by most countries. At the most recent General Assembly, 145 countries supported our resolution calling for such a ban as an urgent arms control measure. Of the 6 countries which opposed or abstained on the resolution, 5 are members of this Conference. I appeal today for greater flexibility to enable this Conference to begin to address this important issue.

The United States and the USSR have made good progress in almost completing the verification régimes for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. But the fact is that both of these treaties were signed over a decade ago. They are not a substitute for a comprehensive test ban and will not put any real brake on the development of nuclear weapons. We urge all testing States to work towards a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date.

Nevertheless the two threshold treaties, despite their drawbacks, can contribute towards this goal through their verification régimes, which provide further proof that monitoring compliance with a comprehensive test ban is possible. In fact determining that an explosion has occurred is easier than measuring its size.

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

It is with the objective of verification in mind that New Zealand is active in this Conference's ad hoc seismic group and its second major technical test now under way. Our seismic network stretches from Rarotonga to the Antarctic, making a significant contribution to the global nature of the test. We have also recently upgraded our seismic facilities and data communications network.

We urge all States to participate to the fullest extent possible in the test. The wider the participation, the stronger will be the message that there are no verification problems in the way of negotiating a comprehensive test ban.

Finally on this subject, I wish to pay tribute to last year's strenuous efforts by Ambassador Yamada of Japan in trying to achieve agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on testing. It is a great shame that his efforts were not successful. I know that his successor, Ambassador Donowaki, is making equally strenuous efforts to resolve the impasse, and I understand that these are producing some positive developments. This is welcome.

Frustration at lack of progress on a test ban has already led many States to seek amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. To achieve that would still require a dramatic change of attitude to a comprehensive test ban on the part of some depositary parties, which unfortunately does not seem likely at present. However, I believe that the amendment conference can serve a useful purpose by providing what this Conference has so far failed to provide - an in-depth exchange of views on testing. It is unfortunate that, in the PTBT context, not all testing States will be involved. But discussion of these issues is long overdue.

It is not only on a nuclear test ban that the Conference has failed to meet widespread expectations. Item 6, on negative security assurances, is another area where, despite broad agreement, little concrete progress has been achieved.

Since 1979, after the nuclear-weapon States gave unilateral NSAs, the Conference on Disarmament has searched for a common formula having a legally binding status. The search has so far eluded us. Some might argue that cuts in nuclear arsenals decrease the need for NSAs. Yet even after START there will be over 35,000 operational nuclear warheads in the world. NSAs will be an important part of the fabric of security for the foreseeable future.

One positive factor is the unanimous agreement on the need to continue the search for a common formula on NSAs. In that search we should not lose sight of two fundamental facts. First, the debate on NSAs does not take place in a legal vacuum. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter sets out the most fundamental negative security assurance derived from customary international law - the prohibition on any use of force except in self-defence.

The principle enshrined in that Article is basic to the security of all nations. In seeking a common formula on NSAs in a nuclear weapons context, we are merely seeking to elaborate further (and in no way to derogate from) the prohibition on the use of force set out in the Charter - bearing in mind, of course, the special destructive potential of nuclear weapons.

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

The second point is this: when the different NSA declarations are examined it can be seen that all nuclear-weapon States have acknowledged that resort to nuclear weapons could only be envisaged in a far more limited range of circumstances than resort to conventional weapons.

It is New Zealand's hope that greater common ground can be developed on negative security assurances. We were pleased to note the progress evident at the General Assembly last year on this issue. For the first time New Zealand was able to vote in favour of both resolutions put forward on this subject. I hope that constructive developments towards arriving at a common formula on NSAs will occur during the present CD session. But if we are to find this common ground we must stop viewing the unilateral NSAs as principally reflecting irreconcilable security perceptions. Most importantly it is a debate about the further elaboration of existing legal rules which prohibit the use of force. It is only if we adopt this more constructive path that we can hope to make any progress towards achieving legally binding assurances. We will elaborate further on this view during the current session.

There are many urgent issues already on the CD's agenda where progress is lacking. But the Conference should also not fail to seize upon new issues where it can make a useful contribution. The question of naval forces is a critical one. Naval forces are not built up, maintained - or used - in isolation from overall military force structures. Their elimination should be discussed in the context of other disarmament issues so as not to introduce new disequilibriums. Of course, focus on naval forces is not the prerogative of the super-Power alone. There is increasing international concern about the global implications of sea-borne weapons and I believe the issue is not only legitimate but also an urgent matter for discussion by this body. In this respect a recent decision by the United States to phase out some categories of sea-borne weapons is welcome.

Earlier in this session, Sweden called for the negotiation of naval confidence-building measures and modernization of the laws of sea warfare. The Swedish Disarmament Ambassador also suggested that the question of prevention of incidents on the high seas should be put on the agenda of this Conference under agenda item 3. I support this and urge the Conference to take up the opportunity to address this potential threat to the disarmament progress which is being made in other respects.

I would like to take the opporunity to make some observations about the procedural aspects of the CD's work. The first relates to the composition of this body. In 1984 the CD decided, in principle, to increase its membership by not more than four members. It is a matter of regret to my delegation that this decision has not yet been implemented. Although New Zealand has applied for membership, I do not expect that initial expansion will involve us. Others have waited longer and their role in the Conference's work more than justifies their presence at the main negotiating table. The longer-term question of the CD's membership is a very real one which still has to be addressed. But the more immediate impasse, over the 1984 decision, has lasted too long. We urge CD members to implement that decision which they themselves agreed unanimously.

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

This year 34 States have obtained observer status - an all-time high. It is a measure of international interest in the Conference's work. There is sometimes a preception that virtually all of us present in this room are observers in the disarmament process, and that the real work rests with the two major Powers. There is no denying that the nuclear-weapon States, and primarily the super-Powers, have a special responsibility for international disarmament and a treaty obligation in that respect. But success or failure in the disarmament process affects us all. And we all have a right - indeed a duty - to take part in the work of this Conference - the sole multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. Ultimately the bilateral and multilateral approaches to disarmament must be mutually reinforcing.

Many of the issues I have spoken about today are concerned with the horizontal proliferation of weapons. And despite progress on East/West issues horizontal proliferation is increasing. The proliferation of missile technology - a key link in building weapons of mass destruction - is of growing concern. Short-range weapons have already had a devastating effect in some areas. The spread of long-range weapons will put even more States at risk. I welcome international efforts to contain this problem. Regional arrangements to stem proliferation and build security also have an important role to play. South Pacific States have addressed the problem of nuclear proliferation through the Treaty of Rarotonga. The South Pacific is not a zone of nuclear confrontation. We are determined to keep it that way. All the countries which signed the Treaty of Rarotonga have now ratified it. And at last year's General Assembly 151 States supported a resolution commending the Treaty. It is regrettable that one nuclear-weapon State continues to test in the region. But China and the USSR have signed the protocols open to them, and the United Kingdom and the United States have stated that they do not act inconsistently with them. New Zealand hopes that France, the United Kingdom and the United States will all reconsider their position on signature in light of the changing international climate.

The Treaty of Rarotonga derives strength from article VII of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. New Zealand will therefore be taking a particularly close interest in the review of the NPT later this year. One focus of the review will be the extent to which the nuclear-weapon States have fulfilled their article VI commitments. Not all States regard the answer as clear-cut.

We have seen the elimination of intermediate-range land-based missiles and hopefully, soon, cuts to strategic weapons. But there are other items on the disarmament agenda - and on the agenda of this Conference - where progress is urgent. In the lead-up to the NPT review conference, the 1990 CD session provides an opportunity to demonstrate that the NPT bargain is working. Chemical weapons issues will rightly have centre stage, but they need not crowd out other items. Instead they should be an example of the commitment with which other subjects should be handled.

Last year's General Assembly session confirmed an important trend in arms control. At last a spirit of co-operation is emerging and serious negotiations are possible. There are important subjects on which much more rapid progress is needed. There are also regions of the world where the

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

tide of arms control has yet to flow as strongly as many would wish. That is particularly true of the East Asia-North Pacific region, which is of special concern to New Zealand and the countries of the South Pacific.

We believe that the 1990s - the third United Nations Disarmament Decade - can be the first decade of substantial reductions in the world's arsenals. It will be an historic process. This Conference must decide whether it will be part of that process. New Zealand's view is that it should. We will do all we can to achieve it. And we urge all delegations to approach the present session with that objective in mind.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Her Excellency the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand for her very important statement, and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali-Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the beginning of a new decade - it pleases me to address this Conference once again. At the outset, allow me to offer my best congratulations to you, Sir, for presiding over the work of the Conference during the month of March. I am confident that the Conference will register progress under your able and wise leadership. It is especially pleasing to address the Conference under your presidency after having paid a fruitful visit to your country and to your warm and hospitable people less than two weeks ago. I would also like to take the opportunity to extend my regards to the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Martenson, and Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament.

I very much benefited from the statement of the previous speaker, the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, the Honourable Mrs. Frances Wilde, whose country's commitment to peace and disarmament is axiomatic to all.

This Conference has, ever since its inception, enjoyed a special value and prestige as the sole multilateral body dealing with the most sensitive, complicated and yet vital issue of our time. Attempting to realize formal agreements in various areas of disarmament during a long period in which major Powers and other countries of the world feverishly pursued their global and regional arms race, seemed a devastating or, at times, an impossible task. But, with patience and perseverance, the Conference was able to live through all this and contributed to some agreements while maintaining a constant awareness amongst both Governments and the public. For this, you all deserve to be sincerely congratulated.

We ought to realize, however, that thus far the Conference has, at best, been able to apply the brakes, here and there, to slow down the arms race in some particular areas. I believe it is a fair assessment to judge this spring session as a turning-point, a beginning to a new era, as the stage seems set for the Conference to embark on its real and fundamental task of disarmament the world over.

I must admit, though, that I say this with some caution, as I do not believe we are quite over the hill yet. True, we have made some headway, but the road ahead is still rocky with dangerous turns - and I am not sure whether

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the Conference is fully in the driver's seat, not yet at least. This has already become evident in the formulation of the mandates of the different ad hoc committees, which still suffer handicaps and do not match the requirements of this critical juncture. We especially regret that the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on the CW convention had to be compromised and remained incomplete against the will of the great majority of the members.

The changes in the world require changes in attitudes. The military doctrines that prevailed during the cold war were based on threat perceptions that have become all but obsolete. We understand that developments, particularly in Europe, have been so rapid and so overwhelming that it takes time to catch up and adjust. This much is understandable. But what remains as a source of serious concern is the establishment of a new doctrine based solely on the threat perceptions and security requirements of European countries along with the major Powers, and without due recognition of the needs and requirements of the developing countries.

For years the developing world called for an immediate end to the arms race and a genuine move towards disarmament. Those calls were, for a large part, ignored save in a few instances where the major Powers, based on their own concerns, forged some agreements. This led to a growing notion in the developing countries, especially the more developed ones amongst them, that in order to have any role they need to strengthen their own military capabilities and armaments. There seemed to exist a vague threshold, for quality and quantity of arms acquired and/or developed, beyond which a State qualified as a serious party to the negotiations. That notion still prevails and cannot change, unless the developing world as a whole gains its deserved share in the formation and establishment of the new world order, be it political, economic or military.

Our beloved planet Earth has at last found a very rare opportunity for peace. Not an armed peace, but a sensible peace that is deep and enduring. Yet the seeds of discord are again being sown. The crumbling of a devastating ideology is being replaced with an arrogant claim of total victory by the other. The truth is, in the eyes of the majority of the people of the world, the deprived majority, that both ideologies have failed, as both are materialistic and foreign to human nature.

This has led to a scenario for the future of our world depicting a Utopia where military conflicts have been replaced by economic confrontations. Even if this were a likely scenario, is this all that humanity should be expecting of itself? Is this what it should be reduced to? Certainly not, and it certainly will not.

I do not intend this as polemics. This is a deep conviction that without a corrected approach the chances for a secure, peaceful and disarmed world will once again be lost. Disarmament, in its true meaning, can only be realized if arrogance and dominance give way to equality and justice.

In this highly interrelated world, no one State, or collection of States, can claim to organize global security. No nation, large or small, can gain security at the expense of insecurity for others. Military concepts and

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strategies need to be scrutinized in a bid to reach a new security policy thinking. In order for the negotiations to be conducive to meaningful results, there have to be common understandings on security concepts both at the global and the regional levels. There also has to be confidence in the law. People who feel threatened or unprotected by law may be forced to disarm but, even so, it will surely be a temporary disarmament and arms will again be picked up at the earliest chance.

This is particularly significant in our region. It may seem today that Europe is the centre of the world. Well, this may be a valid assessment in a narrow time span. But history has largely been developed, shaped or affected by events in the Middle East. After all, this is a region that has given birth to three of the greatest prophets of God. The area from the Persian Gulf to the North of Africa can rightly be called the mirror of history and the mirror of the world.

This is most valid in regard to the CW convention. As the victim of the most extensive and horrendous chemical attacks we have a heartfelt desire for a ban on these weapons. We have suffered the catastrophic effects of chemical weapons on our military personnel as well as our civilians. We have also been a first-hand witness to the holocaust in Halabja which, on its second anniversary, still brings people to shivers, tears, anger and outrage. Thus, to us, there is not just an obligation, but a deep moral and inner urge for the abolishment and complete eradication of these barbarous weapons.

Yet, against this background, our country is faced with a complex paradox. In our immediate vicinity, we have a country that has waged a devastating war against us and, through it, has used chemical weapons at will. Even now, after the cease-fire, it is engaged in an extensive and ambitious programme of development and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. This is aside from potential threats from some other countries in the region, which are continuously arming themselves with advanced and sophisticated weaponry.

Under these conditions, we have two options. One is to follow logic and reason and convert capabilities and expertise in the field of chemical weapons acquired during the course of the war into practice as a deterrent vis-à-vis immediate and potential threats. The other is to follow our urge and set our hopes on a still ambiguous convention, and be prepared for a possible risk, or perhaps serious jeopardy, to our security. Despite the odds, we have decided to follow our urge, but we need assurances.

We do not intend to set pre-conditions. But there are necessities arising from the merits of the situation. Let us not forget that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, followed by a chemical and missile build-up in the area, was a prime factor in giving momentum to the CW convention. Therefore for the success of the convention, there has to be genuine adherence to and full implenentation of the convention in our region.

To be frank, if the convention were ready today, the chances of its success in our region would be somewhere near zero. Without undermining the importance of the understandings at the level of major CW-producing countries,

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special attention should be maintained on the question of security in our region throughout the negotiations. Therefore, to assure success of the convention, in a broad and general scope, the following needs to be realized.

The continuation of a "no war, no peace" situation breeds tension in the region and keeps hostilities at the threshold of danger. In such an atmosphere countries with capabilities will find it very difficult to give away the CW option. Diplomatic efforts should therefore be mobilized to bring resolution 598 to the stage of immediate implementation.

Once the conflict ends, the two sides, as well as the other countries in the region, will be in a position to engage in a constructive dialogue, not as immediate or potential enemies or supporters of this or the other side, but as neighbours with common objectives and goals. The task can take the form of intensive and informal discussions, at first, to bring into the open the threat perceptions of each country - much like the current CSCE exercise in Vienna.

This may be followed by formal collective security arrangements in the region, including measures to prevent war and for reduction of arms as well as eradication of chemical weapons, on the understanding that the latter is an independent, more urgent issue.

The convention must be as foolproof and as intrusive as possible. We cannot risk our security and give up the CW option now in exchange for a weak convention at the end. In the past, the mistrust between the major producing countries was a prelude to a more concrete and detailed approach. At the same time the prospects for early realization of the convention were dim. Now, with changes in relations, issues may be simplified. The chances for an early convention can therefore be much higher now. But we should avoid over-simplification which may compromise the intrusive and binding character of the convention.

A high degree of automaticity must be maintained in the convention. Iran has been a victim of chemical weapons as well as political selectivity. We cannot therefore leave our security at the mercy of political decisions. Automaticity should include: firstly, a mechanism that ensures the availability of all relevant information, including information on possible violations, to all member States without any political prejudice; secondly, the concretization of routine and challenge inspections and inspections in the event of alleged use in a manner not hampered by political decisions; thirdly, provisions for sanctions and other punitive measures based directly on technical reports and not political decisions in cases of violations, and particularly in cases of use; and fourthly, a level of automatic assistance to the victims of use or the threat of use.

The element of timing and the order of destruction is also significant. We believe the 10-year period is too long and can make many things unpredictable. With political will, technical problems may be surmounted to reduce this time span. Moreover, the order of destruction should be formulated not just on a quantitative but also on a qualitative basis. This, for us, has tremendous security implications and we need to be quite watchful of it.

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The convention should indeed be universal. Though the notions of non-proliferation are gradually fading, they are not yet fully disposed of. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the availability of chemical technology for civil use must not be compromised by the convention. Technological assistance for developing countries is thus underlined.

As far as the Organization is concerned, we believe that the countries most affected need to have a better chance for representation.

I should add that, as regards our region, it is imperative that the countries concerned should join the convention simultaneously. Moreover, while we share the concerns about proliferation of nuclear arms in our region and its parallels with chemical weapons, we do not feel that there has to be a direct link if this would compromise the fate of the CW convention. In fact, we should strongly pursue the issue of nuclear proliferation in our region during the fourth NPT review conference.

For more than 20 years the have-nots of the non-proliferation Treaty have lived up to their obligations in good faith while the nuclear-weapon States have not respected their duties stipulated in article VI of the Treaty. While horizontal proliferation is a risk, vertical proliferation is a reality. The opponents of the Treaty rightly argue that those who have remained outside have benefited more than those who are in.

As long as the "nuclear" items on the agenda of this Conference are almost dead issues, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban remain pending and no agreement is reached for a legally binding convention or instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the States parties to the NPT will be sceptical and the NPT will remain a vulnerable Treaty.

Finally, I would like to reiterate once again that in the new climate where confrontation is giving way to co-operation, efforts should be made towards directing the winds of change to the good of mankind. Our task in this Conference calls for changes in attitudes and a new constructive approach to the issues before us. Our efforts should therefore focus on resolving the most acute problems based on justice and our global obligations. We should be pragmatic and realistic in our work and at the same time strive to achieve the ideals of a better world in which all peoples are treated equally, since God the Almighty created us all equal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): May I begin by expressing our appreciation to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran for their very interesting and thought-provoking interventions today? May I also express to you, Mr. President, the profound satisfaction felt by my delegation at seeing you in the Chair during the month of March? I am convinced that you will

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successfully guide the Conference's work, thanks to your personal commitment, great experience and diplomatic skill, which will enable the Conference to gain the necessary momentum. Let me express our appreciation for the efforts undertaken already by you to facilitate substantive work. As far as my delegation is concerned, I can assure you of its fullest support. Your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his competence and negotiating skills which helped create the necessary conditions for starting our Conference's work.

Issues of nuclear disarmament are on the plenary's agenda. My statement today addresses questions related to it. I do so as this task is assuming new dimensions against the background of ongoing historic changes, growing confidence in international relations and improved co-operation in the safeguarding of peace. To persist in outworn patterns of thought in the face of such developments, we think, would mean gambling away chances for a more peaceful world, and latest developments, I think, are reflecting this.

If a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought, then rapid and serious steps in the nuclear disarmament process are the only logical alternative. Anyone who acts differently contradicts life. The INF Treaty is material evidence of the understanding that more nuclear weapons do not spell more security. Further evidence of this is provided by the Soviet-American negotiations on the halving of their strategic offensive weapons. The two great nuclear Powers have pushed open the door for nuclear disarmament and have initiated further steps towards this end.

Our Conference itself, being testimony of the commitment to disarmament in the nuclear field too, can and must make an important contribution in this endeavour. Notwithstanding all the efforts towards leading the negotiations on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons to a successful conclusion, we should not lose sight of this fact. After years of protracted deliberations it is time to get down to business with regard to the nuclear items on our agenda, too. Nobody underestimates the difficulties involved. Yet should this be allowed to hinder us from fully harnessing the potential for agreement and meeting each other half-way in the course of practical work? What counts, from our point of view, is that a beginning is made.

This goes particularly for the prohibition of nuclear weapon testing. Here lies the key to curbing the nuclear arms race and considerably restricting the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons. We believe that 45 years after the first nuclear weapon test was carried out, it is more than advisable to start work on basic elements of a test-ban treaty. A favourable aspect in that context is the development of national technical means of verification. This is also borne out in the results achieved by the Group of Seismological Experts and in the Soviet-American verification experiment. It is precisely for these reasons that the German Democratic Republic has actively participated in the start-up tests for the global seismic data exchange test, GSETT-2. And it is for these reasons that my country figures among those States participating in phase 2, which is to start this year.

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Let me also reaffirm my country's support for action either to amend the GSE's mandate on aspects of a verification system for monitoring a comprehensive test ban which go beyond the questions of seismology, or to establish a new expert group on this item. Preparing for effective verification is the underlying aim of other proposals. Our delegation circulated a pertinent working paper (CD/902) last year, suggesting the development of procedures for on-site inspections. In our view, such a method could help verify the decommissioning of nuclear testing sites and could assist in detecting and identifying seismic events whose status is unclear. Detailed documentation on these questions is under preparation.

As has already been outlined in the general debate, the German Democratic Republic considers that a subsidiary organ of the Conference should be set up to discuss the nuclear test ban in a business-like manner. We hold that Czechoslovakia's proposal submitted in document CD/863 could be a practical solution provided all sides display their good will. The outcome of yesterday's presidential consultations is encouraging in this regard. Like any attempt at compromise document CD/863 does not of course correspond to what we consider the optimum, but it could help make a fresh start.

Here it is to be added that the German Democratic Republic has from the very beginning endorsed the initiative of non-aligned countries for a conference on the broadening of the 1963 Moscow Treaty. We do so since we believe that in the wake of such a conference the CD could be given decisive momentum. The wrangling about the date of this amendment conference seems to be over. This can be gathered from the compromise recently agreed upon in New York. Our delegation considers that work should now be focused on substantive preparations for this conference. The German Democratic Republic is willing to play its part in solving the related problems.

More than a quarter of a century ago, in the preamble to the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the original parties undertook "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". Never before, we think, have the prerequisites been more propitious for carrying out this commitment than today. Let us take the necessary steps to this effect now. This would create a new dimension of confidence which would be of advantage to the disarmament process as a whole.

We too feel concerned about the fact that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has not made any headway on the issue of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The recent debates, which were aimed at identifying a constructive solution in terms of item 2 of our agenda, are not very encouraging. We are in favour of arriving at a mutually agreed solution soon on how to proceed in this matter.

What is there actually to be said against a structured debate in the plenary on issues related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament? Why should the idea of elaborating principles governing nuclear disarmament not be considered in depth? Is it not a worthwhile job for the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on the

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cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes? Steps to prevent fissionable material released by disarmament measures from being reused for weapons purposes would have to be discussed in this context. Why shouldn't we tackle the issues regarding measures to halt the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, as has been suggested by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands?

The possibility of also negotiating confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear disarmament in the CD should, in our view, not be brushed aside. In this context, one could think of making transparent the arrangements made by the military alliances concerning the stationing and right of disposal of nuclear weapons. Confidence-building could surely be promoted outside the military alliances by disclosing the use of foreign territory for delivery systems. Proposals already exist for disclosing the existence of nuclear weapons on vessels calling at foreign ports. This shows that there is really no lack of substance for a subject-related discussion of the agenda item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

Finally, the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is in the offing. We hope that it will be held in a constructive manner. This treaty has lost nothing of its topicality. Since its entry into force 20 years ago, this treaty has been an important instrument against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the German Democratic Republic will declare at the forthcoming NPT review conference that the non-proliferation régime should be maintained and consolidated. This objective can be achieved in the context of measures to reduce and ultimately eliminate these weapons of mass destruction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): We have also listened with the greatest of interest to the important statements that have just been made by the Minister for Disarmament of New Zealand and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We wish to express to you, Mr. President, our satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair and at the effective and skilful way in which you have been guiding our work.

We would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to a champion of disarmament, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, originator of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and dean of this Conference for many years, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico. We do not feel that Ambassador Garcia Robles has left us; he will be with us constantly in this room and constantly in the efforts that are made to promote nuclear disarmament. We have always admired his devotion and contribution to the cause of disarmament, and therefore we convey to him our sincere gratitude.

Today it is not possible to make a statement in the United Nations without referring to the momentus changes that are taking place on the international stage. References to these events and their potential favourable effects are of particular importance in a forum such as this, which is devoted

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to the promotion of such important causes as that of disarmament. It is really possible, after all, to lay the foundations for an era of solidarity and co-operation; it is really possible, through openness and constructive dialogue, to attenuate dogmatism and intransigence in times of renewal. Hence without making exaggerated claims it is quite legitimate to express the hope that, through a continuing and upward process, these historic times in which we are living now will be consolidated for the benefit of those specific purposes which are being pursued in this forum and which concern everyone. Nuclear disarmament cannot continue to be a quixotic undertaking, much less an abstraction that we frequently invoke with overtones of Utopia.

In recent decades we have been living in a nuclear peace based on well-known and repeatedly stated doctrines of nuclear deterrence. It is somehow supposed, ironically, that we should be grateful for this world peace that has been given to us by nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, and without this being a sentimental appeal, our aspiration has been and will continue to be that of trying to make progress towards a form of world peace based on a positive premise and not on the balance of terror. I say this despite the ineluctable realities with which, it seems, we have to live.

No less legitimate an aspiration is that concepts of security can evolve in keeping with the changes generated by the international dynamic. For example, for how long can we sustain the argument that we have to continue to arm ourselves because of the alleged nuclear superiority of one Power or another? Or that we have to arm ourselves in order to disarm, perhaps, in possible negotiations? It is clear that now, to complicate things even more, we are not just dealing with the quantitative factor in the arms race; intense and growing qualitative competition is creating new dilemmas and raising natural misgivings, holding all of us hostage in a kind of vicious circle dictated mainly by technological progress.

Be this as it may, the fact is that recently efforts have been made to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, whose significance we have to acknowledge. To the satisfaction of all, the first-ever agreement for the elimination of a category of weapons has been reached, and, despite the inevitable scepticism stemming from so many frustrations, reasonable expectations are taking shape in the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons - at least we hope so. Consequently, it cannot be denied that disarmament efforts have finally received an impetus which, although modest, is not yet obviously an irreversible trend. The will to reject confrontation does not easily become established, as we well know, so that we cannot but hope that the countries that possess the most sophisticated and destructive weapons will acquire the experience, motivation and sensitivity that are necessary to reach significant agreements on disarmament.

Although it is true that the nuclear Powers bear primary responsibility in disarmament negotiations and that we welcome any bilateral agreements that can be reached, it is always a good thing to remember that the international community has a vital interest in helping to ensure that such negotiations produce reliable results. Hence we persist in emphasizing the close interdependence and complementarity between bilateral and multilateral efforts. Until now the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on the subject, has not been able to play a role commensurate with the

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responsibilities entrusted to it. Since its establishment it has not been able to establish ad hoc committees on the items relating to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war, nor has there been consensus on the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. Above all, however, we continue to hope that this Conference, prompted by recent international events, will begin to play fully its proper role, and that the efforts being pursued at the bilateral and regional levels will lead to results in this forum.

Venezuela attaches high priority to the conclusion of a treaty designed to introduce a complete ban on nuclear testing - without doubt, an objective of the greatest importance which has proved elusive so far. It is for this reason that, along with a representative group of countries, we took the initiative of promoting the conversion of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty into a treaty that would enshrine a total ban on testing. To this effect we have proposed the convening of an amendment conference. Here we may recall the content of the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations which was read out by his personal representative, Ambassador Komatina, to the effect that efforts to amend the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963 and turn it into a comprehensive test ban reflect widespread concern over the present situation. It should be remembered that in the Conference on Disarmament, during the 1989 session, Ambassador Yamada of Japan held consultations about the possibility of adopting an appropriate mandate for the establishment of the committee. Ambassador Donowaki continued these consultations, which should open the way once and for all towards the prompt and full consideration of this important subject.

We attach major importance to all actions designed to lead to the completion of the convention banning chemical weapons. We agree with others that the Paris and Canberra conferences helped to bring about awareness in public opinion and motivate the sectors most directly concerned in the application of the future convention. All this, taken together with the results of the meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Minister for Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze in September 1989 and last month, give grounds for a degree of optimism about the future evolution of the negotiations. We take note of the recent joint statement describing the outcome of the last meeting, which indicates the intention of the two Governments to reach a bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. It is to be hoped that this proposal will lead to tangible results in the negotiations taking place here, and that the total destruction of all chemical weapons will be carried out without further delay.

As we announced at the last United Nations General Assembly, Venezuela, desirous of making a contribution to international efforts to prepare the necessary conditions for the rapid implementation of the future convention, has taken the initiative of organizing in Caracas, in the middle of this year, a regional seminar for participants from Latin American and Caribbean countries. The purpose is to familiarize the States that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament with the scope, purposes and objectives of the convention, as well as the verification machinery that is to be established. In due course we will provide further information about this event.

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Chemical weapons form an area where we have seen progress and a display of political will which somehow should also spread to other items of our agenda. Consequently we are happy to note the progress made during 1989 and at the beginning of this year in the negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee. The intensification of efforts in the Committee under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Morel led to progress in overcoming some of the existing difficulties. We would like to thank Ambassador Morel for the work that he accomplished, and to express our satisfaction at the results achieved. Now we see with pleasure that a representative of the Group of 21 is chairing the Ad hoc Committee for this year - Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, to whom we offer our full co-operation.

One of the sectors which is worth highlighting is that of verification, with the preparation of a text on inspection procedures that is now serving as a basis for continued consideration of this point. Another of the areas in which progress has been made is that of technical aspects, in the areas of definitions, schedules of chemical substances and review arrangements, the declaration and verification régime, and so on. Unfortunately in the Committee progress has not been made to the same extent in the consideration of other important items, some of them of a political nature, such as those concerning assistance, economic and technological development, sanctions and the aspect relating to reservations. The intensive consultations held on two important issues - article IX, on challenge inspections, and the issue relating to the composition of the Executive Council - led to better understanding of the subject, although major differences still persist. We do not undervalue the improvements made in the mandate of the Committee for this session, but we are concerned that it contains no reference to the question of the prohibition of use. This is a point that deserves special attention.

As the negotiations proceed in the Committee, it becomes increasingly desirable to examine the question of the financial implications that will arise under the future convention on chemical weapons. Venezuela has placed on record its concern at the size and complexity of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons which is being outlined within the context of the convention, especially because of the financial burden that its operations would impose on the States parties to the instrument. There is a need for a clear definition of the principles that will serve as the basis for apportioning the cost of the functioning and the operation of the organization. The Ad hoc Committee should examine this matter carefully. We think it appropriate to reiterate the message of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference.

We would like to express appreciation for the efforts made during 1989 by Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Likewise we reiterate our congratulations to Ambassador Shannon of Canada on his appointment as Chairman of the Committee for this session. Our delegation has assigned special importance to the initiatives relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is for this reason that Venezuela has insisted, both in the Conference plenary and in the Ad hoc Committee, on the need to focus our efforts on the adoption of specific measures designed to prevent an arms race in this environment. This procedure would be in keeping with the content of

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the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and here I would like to refer to the most recently adopted resolution, resolution 44/112, which in operative paragraph 8 requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1990 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Such a decision is becoming more and more urgent by the day because of the justified concern of the international community about the use of new technologies in the military field, and the application of scientific research for the development for new weapons that are designed to be used in outer space. As to the specific work of the Committee, we have noted with concern the attitude of some countries that are trying to limit the Committee's work indefinitely to a general exchange of views on the subject, and their lack of interest in carrying out concrete negotiations.

The work done in previous years has led to progress in the examination and identification of the various questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A number of questions have been identified, and although we have not achieved a common approach, there is better understanding of the problems and of the various views. The Committee has given careful consideration to the applicable legal régime for outer space through a detailed analysis of the existing treaties on the subject. It has been recognized that this régime applicable to space is not, as such, sufficient to prevent an arms race there. Hence the need to consolidate it, strengthen it and make it more effective. There is also a need for strict observance of existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

A sizeable number of measures have been proposed to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure that the exploration and use of space will be pursued solely for peaceful purposes, in the interest of and to the benefit of all countries. Some of these proposals involve an all-embracing approach, for the total, universal prohibition of weapons in space at the earliest date. Others are specific proposals for partial measures, as well as some measures concerning confidence-building. In the future work of the Committee account should be taken of the work already done. For this reason we believe that the time has come for the Committee to focus its attention on the consideration of concrete measures designed to prevent an arms race in outer space. Thus our position is clearly based on very practical and realistic reasons, and not on symbolic or whimsical positions. We would like to reiterate the proposal that was presented by the delegation of Venezuela in this body, designed to extend the partial ban on space weapons set forth in the outer space Treaty of 1967 to convert it into a total ban that would cover any kind of weapon or system of such weapons that could be used in space, from space or into space. This proposal, which is designed to bring about a comprehensive approach, is contained in document CD/851 dated 2 August 1988.

Thinking on the efficiency and functioning of the Conference on Disarmament is particularly appropriate in the light of recent international changes. During the course of this general debate opinions and concerns have been expressed regarding the adaptation of this body to the "new times". We agree that it is necessary to adapt, but in order to revitalize this Conference as far as possible, and not to modify it or detract from commitments that are

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intrinsic in efforts being made in the field of nuclear disarmament. Like other speakers I will also refer to the statement made by Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil, but to quote his words "now that confrontation along East-West lines has abated and verification has been accepted as a major ingredient in any disarmament or arms limitation agreement, it is as if unexpected success and a dramatic change of circumstances have had a paralysing effect on some of us". We must react decisively to the new international situation, and we must do so in a constructive spirit. We are also in favour of efforts by the Group of Seven, or any other informal body as has been suggested, to embark on an examination of the challenges and dilemmas that face this Conference as far as its viability is concerned. Obviously even the most experienced and skilful diplomat, even the most knowledgeable about the subject, will be unable to put forward ideas that will bear fruit if, at the moment of truth, the indispensable political will to negotiate is lacking. As far as the delegation of Venezuela is concerned, I must say that the purposes of the Conference on Disarmament are well defined and more valid than ever before, as a reflection of the universal aspiration of the international community. The favourable international circumstances, rather than making these precise objectives more distant, should help make the efforts of the Conference more productive - efforts which are not vain, and which we consider essentially realistic in today's world and, in the final analysis, in keeping with the unrenounceable desire to tackle resolutely the problems caused by nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, who will speak in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for agenda item 4.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): As you have just said, Mr. President, I have asked for the floor today in my capacity as item co-ordinator on chemical weapons to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21. Before exercising this responsibility I wish to seize this opportunity to express my delegation's genuine pleasure at seeing a distinguished, able and highly esteemed Nigerian diplomat presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the month of March. We are at the mid-point of your presidency and already we have benefited from your competent leadership in many respects, including the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I wish also to pay tribute to your two very eminent predecessors, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands and Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, for their distinguished and highly appreciated efforts while presiding over the CD.

On behalf of the Group of 21, I should like to make the following statement.

The Group of 21 is committed to the early conclusion of the negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. This convention should be of universal adherence.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The Group of 21 reaffirms its position that the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit the use of such weapons under any circumstance from the date the convention enters into force. In the view of the Group of 21, this undertaking has already been agreed to in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft convention.

To this end all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities shall be destroyed during the destruction period of 10 years as stipulated in article IV, paragraph 5 and article V, paragraph 8, and as reflected in the agreed proposal by the two major chemical weapons possessors on the order of destruction. This undertaking shall be without any reservation. The stocks and facilities shall be monitored by the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons until their total destruction not later than the end of the destruction period.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

I have requested the secretariet to circulate today a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 20 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.544
20 March 1990

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeke Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

GE.90-60392/3083a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 544th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Belgium and Peru. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Houllez.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, let me say how pleased my delegation is at seeing you presiding over our work since the beginning of March. Your abilities and your authority, universally appreciated by all the participants, offer a guarantee of success for the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me also, on the same occasion, indirectly to congratulate Ambassador Wagenmakers, who brilliantly accomplished the formidable task of starting up the Conference's work in February this year. I would also like to bid welcome to all the new colleagues who have recently joined us and assure them of my delegation's desire to co-operate closely with them.

The events that have been taking place in Europe over the last few months at a very fast rate have featured in the initial statements of the Conference's session, and rightly so, as a phenomenon which is unprecedented and unexpected, at least in terms of scale. The shift from military and ideological confrontation towards co-operation and trust forms the basis of an improvement in international relations, particularly in their East/West context, but also brings with it positive implications world-wide. I think it is wrong to say that everything happened in 1989. Let us rather say that a trend which had been taking shape for some time was speeded up by the adoption of the universal values of pluralist democracy, freedom and human rights more or less everywhere. Nevertheless, the rate at which this change is occurring - however positive it may be - carries with it the risk of a loss of control if the countries involved in these changes do not take the necessary precautions and show the restraint which is required to keep the situation in hand or direct it in a way which guarantees the security, the integrity and the right of all countries. The confidence needed to consolidate this encouraging atmosphere can only be maintained if these conditions are met. Consequently, it is incumbent on all to pursue a policy which, despite the speed of change, has an eye to the longer term - a policy which allows time to consider carefully the future implications of decisions which might otherwise, in a headlong rush, be taken in too much haste or in a too short a perspective. Whatever replaces the last manifestations of the cold war cannot contain the seeds of new difficulties, either in Europe through an uncontrolled spiral taking no account of other people's interests, or in other regions of the world. We also run the risk of seeing the improvement in the climate lead to a lack of interest in arms control or disarmament.

(Mr. Houllez, Belgium)

It might be held that, with restored confidence, the world and public opinion are losing their awareness of the need to reduce arms. Yet arms are the consequence and not the cause of hostility, and there is in fact a need to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the political climate to strengthen and stabilize it, by drawing up disarmament agreements. It is not important whether such agreements are the result of bilateral consultations or multilateral negotiations, even if it must be recognized that the solution of problems outside Europe should be the result of negotiations involving all the regions or all the countries concerned. We cannot concentrate on Europe alone, where a new form of security is taking shape, provided, as I have already had occasion to say, that we move forward prudently and with realism. Fortunately, the improvement in relations between the two super-Powers also contains potential for the solution of regional problems outside Europe. It would be illogical and sad to see a new European architecture based on new ideas of security and respect for universal values contrasting with an increase in the danger of an outbreak of conflict in other countries of the world.

On several occasions Belgian delegations in New York or here in Geneva have expressed their apprehension at the growing number of countries acquiring ballistic missiles or the technology to produce them or to increase their range, in particular if this phenomenon goes hand in hand with nuclear or chemical capabilities. The proliferation of ballistic missiles in several areas of tension is creating a new security problem, not so much in a global context as in relations between neighbouring countries which often are or consider themselves to be developing countries. It should not be forgotten that among those countries which possess missiles, several have the means to develop chemical or even biological weapons, and some even have the technology to produce nuclear weapons. The number of States which can pose a threat to their neighbours is steadily increasing despite the economic problems which these countries are often facing and the increased risk of proliferation even towards terrorist groups. In most cases this proliferation is due to technology exports or the relative ease of increasing the range and accuracy of imported missiles.

Hence we believe that the improvement in the global system of international relations, while benefiting from changes in the European theatre, in the broadest sense of the term, should lead to new efforts in arms control and disarmament. My delegation is convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a principal role to play in this attempt to broaden confidence and openness to the world as a whole. If the Conference is to have a chance to contribute here, all the participants will have to decide to rise above the traditional controversies on the role of the Conference which regularly lead us to deadlock, for example, on items 1 (nuclear tests) and 5 (outer space). All delegations are aware of the limits within which these committees can operate, and yet the formula which allows us or would allow us to resume work is or was the cause of considerable delay in starting work. On the subject of the mandate for an ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests, it is logical that in the search for a compromise each group should proceed from a common basis, which, in this particular case, takes the form of the Vejvoda text - the basis on which the praiseworthy efforts of Ambassadors Yamada and Donowaki could be continued.

(Mr. Houllez, Belgium)

Attempts to create more favourable negotiating conditions unilaterally or to bring pressure to bear through parallel initiatives can only reduce the chances of finding a solution. Consequently, my delegation welcomes the flexibility and moderation which has been shown recently by all the groups, and hopes that the ad hoc committee will be established as soon as possible.

The Conference on Disarmament is the only forum which offers the possibility of reaching the final objective, which, as far as Belgium is concerned, is still the complete cessation of tests once and for all. But this requires realism, in other words a gradual stage-by-stage approach. It is our firm hope that the 1974 Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and the 1976 Treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will soon be ratified and that the bilateral consultations between the United States and the USSR on limiting tests will resume in the fairly near future. I might also mention the possible consequences of the positive prospects concerning the conclusion of the negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. As for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation is convinced that, even within the framework which guided the work of the Ad hoc Committee in 1989, it is possible to tackle and to examine in depth almost all the aspects relating to this matter. It is true that the two super-Powers are engaged in a bilateral negotiating process which, we hope, will soon bear fruit, but it is equally true that activities in space are not the prerogative of only a few, in particular as regards verification and confidence-building measures which can be carried out in space. Hence my delegation believes that talks should also continue multilaterally. Consequently, it expresses satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee has been re-established in a spirit of constructive co-operation shown by all the parties. It also wishes to express its warm congratulations to Ambassador Shannon on his election as Chairman of this Ad hoc Committee.

At the last session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the Belgian delegation listed the various reasons which led it to resume negotiations on a chemical weapons convention with optimism: the Paris and Canberra conferences, the restructuring of the subsidiary bodies, President Bush's proposals and so on. Since then we may add to these grounds for optimism the encouraging developments in the inter-sessional meetings, which, thanks to the efforts of the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador P. Morel, have made significant progress possible in the "rolling text". We can also add the contribution made by the documents produced by the bilateral American-Soviet negotiations, the prospects for destruction of American and Soviet stocks even before the Convention enters into force, the improvement in the mandate and the co-operation of a continually growing number of non-member countries in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, a better assurance of large-scale accession to the future convention.

Belgium, which attaches absolute priority to the negotiations on chemical weapons, is aware of the number of important problems still to be settled, such as various aspects of verification, the composition and powers of the Executive Council, the measures to be considered after violations have been detected, the order of destruction, some of the final clauses and co-operation. As we embark on consideration of these problems, and also during the finalization of other parts of the convention, we must draw a

(Mr. Houliez, Belgium)

distinction between substantive problems which can be solved only by means of policy decisions often involving compromises between two different overall approaches (for example multilateralism and bilateralism) and technical details which are of undoubted importance but could be resolved by the preparatory committee or elaborated upon after the convention enters into force. My delegation is afraid that an over-technical approach involving the creation of too many study groups will confirm the risk of concentrating too much time and effort on non-essential aspects. We must also bear in mind that the prime aim of our negotiations is to produce a convention laying down a complete and universal ban on chemical weapons once and for all. This objective has a vertical dimension, namely, the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks belonging to a given State, and the destruction of its CW production facilities, and also a horizontal dimension, namely, the universal nature of the effective, complete and verifiable renunciation of chemical weapons. Belgium believes that we should be able to expect that both dimensions of this objective will be achieved.

For Belgium it is essential for States to state unequivocally their commitment to renounce chemical weapons completely within the context of the future treaty which will provide the legal framework for this commitment. We have always been aware that this treaty would achieve its objective in all its dimensions only if the international community, by acceding to it in large numbers, demonstrates its joint resolve to prove that nothing can any longer justify the maintenance of the CW option. The final aim of our work is not so much to conclude a treaty as to provide ourselves with an effective legal instrument which has every chance of leading us towards the effective, complete and verifiable renunciation of chemical weapons. To achieve this aim, three crucial stages have to be traversed successfully: the conclusion of the treaty, its opening for signature and ratification by all States, which will be the gauge of its universality, and the expiry of the transitional period when the aim of the treaty will have to be achieved in both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions.

In this Conference we are concentrating on the first of these stages in order to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that the subsequent stages are successfully negotiated. When working on the text of the convention, our Conference must also be aware of the need to reconcile a system which provides as many guarantees of compliance as possible, so as to build confidence, and operation at a reasonable cost, which will enable all countries, great or small, to participate on an equal footing. The verification system has to be sufficiently close-knit to discourage any inclination to violate the provisions by the risk of being caught out in prohibited activities, but it would be too much to seek absolute guarantees. If the risks of violation are greater for chemical weapons because of the many facilities which can produce them and the problems of detecting them, as compared with nuclear weapons, we must also be sufficiently realistic to acknowledge that the numbers of victims in a nuclear conflict would be much higher. We therefore find it illogical to provide for verification systems - and I am thinking in particular of ad hoc inspections of undeclared facilities - whose cost might represent 10 or more times the budget of the IAEA inspection operation, that is to say about $25 million per year. Finally, I would like to say that we should pursue our efforts on chemical weapons with the aim of concluding a convention providing for a total ban in the near future because, as several colleagues

(Mr. Houllez, Belgium)

have already stressed, time is not on our side. This means that any other measure, even if it is effective in present circumstances, cannot replace a convention drawn up by 40 countries which represent the whole world in its geographical and political dimensions.

With the happy prospect of a convention taking shape in the fairly near future, I wish to confirm that Belgium remains ready to host the headquarters of the organization.

I am aware that I have not gone into the details of the various problems facing our Conference, but my delegation will have occasion to return to the subject either in future plenary meetings or in the ad hoc committees which already exist or which have yet to be established. My particular concern was to stress the role of our Conference at the centre of the tide of events around us, and to indicate some of the paths we could follow to obtain the rapid results that are needed.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Mr. Gutiérrez.

Mr. GUTIERREZ (Peru) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Peru would like to take this opportunity to make one or two brief comments on item 5 on our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, my delegation would first like to restate its permanent readiness to co-operate so that during the current month the Nigerian presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, in the person of Ambassador Azikiwe, may achieve significant progress. Likewise, we wish to thank Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for his fruitful work in leading our efforts during the month of February.

A few days ago we adopted a mandate for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, as was very well stated by Ambassador Marín, we did no more than perpetuate a ritual, by means of which we perform the function of gathering ideas and proposals - most of them very useful and with great potential for being developed - without facing up to the essential decision related to this problem, which is to start substantive work on a legally binding convention that will ban all types of weapons from outer space. Arguments such as the need to carry out further analysis of the proposals that we have accumulated over the past five years do nothing but sidestep the question of the urgency with which most of the participants in this Conference view the need to refine the legal régime applicable to outer space.

Several of the distinguished speakers who have taken the floor in this forum over the past weeks have spoken to us about the frenzy of change that is taking place on the international political scene. This "revolution of '89", as some call it, may yet produce tangible results in various sectors of disarmament. We are pleased that in areas such as the limitation of strategic weapons and nuclear tests, or the reduction of troops and chemical stockpiles, we can definitely say we are making progress. Of course we need to have a much more organic and complete link between these achievements and the work of this Conference. Nevertheless, we cannot deny their contribution to

(Mr. Gutiérrez, Peru)

international détente. Yet at the same time that we see all this progress being made, we cannot refrain from noting that in outer space, where the future impact of international co-operation could be very promising, we are experiencing growing militarization that in a short time could deteriorate into an arms race which, in a different environment, would revive phases of confrontation among Powers that we are currently striving to overcome.

Faced with this paradox, it is fair to ask: what justification is there for the development of an arms race in outer space? We have been told in this forum that arms control and disarmament are not ends in themselves but merely means to achieve a more important objective, that of enhancing security - international security, that is; and that in that context military activities in space have a stabilizing function and are vital components of deterrence and strategic stability. My delegation can only accept this reasoning if it involves identifying military activities in space with verification functions from outer space. But we believe that this reasoning breaks down totally when we introduce an element that destabilizes the strategic balance, such as one Power's control of arms technology which could make the capability of the other Power inoperative or limit it significantly. Indeed, I do not think it is fanciful to say that some politically radical circles in the Powers might come to believe that with effective technology which could deal with an attack by the other Power by neutralizing it from outer space and at the same time jam its satellite observation systems, there could be a winner in a nuclear war. And it is precisely views of this type, promoted by the escalation of the arms race in space, which, far from encouraging deterrence and strategic stability, generate a climate of insecurity that affects mankind as a whole.

We agree unreservedly with one of the conclusions set out in an important legal study submitted by a Latin American delegation last year, that any activity carried out in space which affects the security of a subjacent State is unlawful in accordance with article 1, paragraph 1 of the 1967 outer space Treaty. This is so because the Treaty clearly states that the use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of development, and that such use shall be the province of all mankind. Hence, we are speaking here of a legally binding obligation that has been subscribed to by more than 110 States, including all the nuclear-weapon States. Given this obligation it will not do to argue that it was imposed by a majority or that an appeal is being made to feelings and not to reality. It is necessary to accept and carry out what has been voluntarily agreed by practically all our countries.

As was very well described a few days ago by the representative of Mexico, the concern of the United Nations with regard to the situation in outer space began in 1957 with the inclusion of the item entitled "Question of the peaceful use of outer space" in the General Assembly's agenda. Ten years later the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was open for signature. When that Treaty was negotiated, the possibility that space-based anti-satellite weapons or defence systems could be developed was not foreseen. In fact, the Treaty is a response to the challenges that space technology created in the 1960s. Unfortunately, the Treaty has become somewhat limited for the level of development of modern

(Mr. Gutiérrez, Peru)

weapons. It is for that reason that last year my delegation submitted a contribution that is designed to update the level of commitment laid down in article IV of the Treaty and bring it into line with present requirements. We consider that that proposal is still valid.

Under the first paragraph of article IV, States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The problem posed by the scope of this paragraph of article IV is that in expressly prohibiting the placing of a given type of weapon in orbit, it conversely permits the stationing of other types of weapon - a legal loophole exploited by the Powers to develop a new generation of weapons that can be placed in outer space. In order to make up for this shortcoming in the 1967 Treaty temporarily, my delegation believes that it might be useful to consider replacing the first paragraph of article IV by the following text:

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any type of weapon, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner".

We believe that this contribution could temporarily help prevent the development of an arms race in outer space, while we await the political momentum that would allow the substantive negotiation of a comprehensive agreement to prevent an arms race in space, which has been requested of us by the United Nations General Assembly.

Over the five years of deliberations we have accumulated a large number of proposals and ideas which, as my delegation has said, we think are possible, desirable and verifiable. We believe that if the Ad hoc Committee, under the wise guidance of Ambassador Shannon, manages to establish a programme of work this year that accommodates substantively and comprehensively the concerns and interests of all the countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament, we will be laying the foundations to enable this forum to live up to the international community's expectations of us in the field of disarmament.

More than 20 years ago, on 20 July 1969, man reached the Moon. On that momentous occasion, the representatives of the human race left a clear and bold message: "Here men from the planet Earth first set foot upon the Moon. We came in peace for all mankind". We hope that this commitment to peace will be answered with fruitful results in this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

(The President)

At the request of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, I wish to inform you that his consultations on the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee are continuing and, accordingly, the meeting to be held by the Ad hoc Committee this afternoon at 3 p.m. is cancelled.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 22 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.545
22 March 1990

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

GE.90-60401/1740B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 545th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Sri Lanka and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka): This is my first formal statement to this Conference. I would at the very beginning join the others in extending to you, Mr. President, my congratulations on the excellent productive work that has already been accomplished under your able guidance. It gives us confidence to forge ahead with hope and determination for the realization of our aims and objectives in the field of disarmament. The Sri Lanka delegation will always extend to you its fullest support and active co-operation. May I also thank the distinguished Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for the efficient and skilful manner in which he speeded up and steered the work in the burdensome month of February?

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank sincerely all my colleagues who have extended a warm and inspiring welcome to me in this Conference. It is inspiring, because those sentiments signify the collective nature of the endeavour entrusted to us by the peoples and nations we represent, irrespective of whether our respective constituencies are large or small, strong or weak. That endeavour is to codify State practice that can ensure international peace and security through disarmament in a world of dynamic change in which the security of nations can be divisible only notionally. As my predecessor has stated here in this Conference, Sri Lanka has indeed felt it a special honour to represent not merely ourselves but, in a sense, also the vast majority of non-aligned States whose security is based not on weapons, but on the strength of the rule of law applicable in inter-State relations.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome all those who arrived after me in this Conference. They are Ambassador Thomas Ariba Ogada of Kenya, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Horacio Arteaga of Venezuela, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States and Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico.

Recent statements heard in this hall and outside have acknowledged the momentous nature of changes taking place in the European region. The depth of analysis and comments made here by a number of speakers who preceded me indicate the broad range of possibilities in consolidating the work in this forum in safeguarding global security. As a small non-aligned country which relies on multilateral co-operation for the well-being and security of the

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

system of nation States that we have today, we feel gratified that this single multilateral disarmament negotiating body is thus responding collectively to these changes.

Political changes that are taking place in Europe have been widely welcomed as being positive and creative. They have been characterized as laying foundations for the democratization of relations within and among States and for building new security structures based not on confrontation but on co-operation and understanding. We hope that these trends emerging in the traditional battlefields of Europe will provide a basis for a global reappraisal of security doctrines. As a non-aligned country which has advocated concordance and co-operation for global well-being and common security based on mutual assurances and sovereign equality rather than superior strength and implicit threats, we welcome these developments. As a democratic country which has practised universal adult franchise without interruption for over half a century, we welcome the process of democratization and what it promises in terms of global security and stability.

The peace-making and peace-keeping potential of the United Nations has been revitalized by the successes scored in finding peaceful solutions to a number of issues, including those relating to Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Namibia. The biggest multilateral forum is indispensable to meet the accelerating needs of economic and political security. The regional conflicts that have been so managed or resolved have again demonstrated that multilateralism can work when it is enabled to do so. The developing countries which have yet to recover from a lost decade of development, with all that it implies for their security, expect the multilateral process to be strengthened.

We also derive satisfaction from the fact that the two major Powers and their alliances have now recognized the need for genuine nuclear disarmament. The INF agreement and the 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arms expected sooner rather than later are a demonstration of the political feasibility of a less weaponized state of security. The non-aligned countries have long held that the security of our diverse but interdependent world can best be ensured by shedding weapons and not by adding them. If the increasing number of soldiers and military hardware were the symptoms of a deep-rooted political malady as conceived by the cold war protagonists, we must, if belatedly, address ourselves to non-military dimensions of security at a time when both the symptoms and the malady are waning away. Given the interdependent and multifaceted nature of security and threat perceptions, it is axiomatic that those issues should be addressed multilaterally. This Conference, being the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has an indispensable role to play in globalizing new security structures. Without that, any emerging security prescription will lack global validity, since no single part of the world can be assigned exclusivity in conditions of security. We are perhaps far away from a de-weaponized state of security, although general and complete disarmament under international control remains on the international agenda. But if we fail to globalize a less weaponized state of security, there will be the danger of variant forms of old power structures transforming themselves into multi-polar power arrangements manifest in

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

different regions of the world. The attendant instability and accumulation of weapons in various regions would thus aggravate regional tensions which are already propelled by their own regional and internal dynamics. Such phenomena may be less discernible than what was a highly visible adversarial relationship between the two alliance systems during the cold war period. But they entail instability and insecurity for the large majority of smaller countries which do not rely on military power for their own security.

In a world poised for global integration on an unprecedented scale, the answer to this potential danger is not to be complacent in the belief that the managed and reduced nuclear terror will give us enduring peace but to harness the full potential of the multilateral framework to globalize a progressively less weaponzied security structure. The non-aligned countries at their summit last year in Belgrade reaffirmed this imperative:

> "The non-aligned countries do not pretend, nor are they in a position, to change the world by themselves; but neither can the world be reshaped without them. The non-aligned favour concordance rather than confrontation, regardless of whether common problems of mankind or issues of regional interests are involved."

If this multilateral forum is to be a conduit for global rethinking on new and more democratized security structures, the question arises as to how it should respond to this challenge. The distinguished Ambassador of Brazil focused on some of the issues relevant to this task and a few others have also done likewise. We are encouraged by the very fact that the Conference has already initiated a process of thinking with an open mind. Fundamental to this thinking process are questions which touch upon the attitudes towards the competence of this body and the agenda of the Conference itself. We believe that the Conference has not been debilitated by any structural deficiencies and it has done and will do what its member States enable it to do, no more and no less. The changes that have taken place have brought into sharper focus the need for the Conference to address its agenda more purposefully and seriously if the international community is to derive the benefits of new developments on a global scale. As regards the agenda, while we should be open to new ideas, we should not be hasty in jettisoning what we have, simply because the Conference has not been enabled to do meaningful work for reasons other than procedural and structural. New ideas we welcome. My own delegation and a number of others have in the past focused on the question as to how we should address conventional disarmament questions, whether they are regional or global. The distinguished Ambassador of Sweden referred to the very pertinent issue of naval arms control and related matters. The prohibition of fissionable material production is another question referred to. My delegation therefore believes that the "in-house" mechanism for a process of thinking and reappraisal referred to by the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil is most timely. We expect this exercise to enhance and not diminish the CD's role in responding to new developments.

Multilateral treatment of the cluster of nuclear issues on the CD's agenda deserves attention more than ever. The elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons by the INF Treaty and good prospects for deep reductions in strategic

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

nuclear weapons are welcome developments. It is however a small mercy for the man in the street to know that tons of TNT stacked against him have been halved. Whilst we do not underestimate the complexity involved in pursuing the process of nuclear disarmament, it would indeed to be against the spirit of positive developments which we witness today if multilateral participation in the nuclear disarmament process is denied. If concerns relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to other so-called destabilizing technologies are real, then surely answers will have to be found in addressing nuclear questions in a multilateral context. History has proved that the fragmentation of security concerns which are common to all countries and seeking unilateral control measures to address those concerns has been unsuccessful. It is counter-productive to deny the self-evident truth that nuclear issues are of concern to all countries. It is therefore indispensable that this forum should address these questions with a view to developing broad principles and a framework for the stages of the global nuclear disarmament process.

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has now become more topical and urgent. This is not only because persistent international endeavours for nearly three decades have failed to bring about a halt to nuclear testing but also because of recent developments and forthcoming events related to a CTBT. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains one of the most decisive steps against the emergence of nuclear weapons and more nuclear-weapon States. If the risk of nuclear proliferation is real, the opportunity to erect an effective barrier against such an undesirable development through a CTBT is also real. The commitments enshrined in the letter and spirit of the partial test-ban Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time reflect this reality. The large majority of parties to these two instruments are puzzled and frustrated that persistent international calls to conclude a CTBT have remained unheeded. If the major nuclear Powers now recognize that they have built up excessive nuclear arsenals and that security could be achieved at lower levels of those armaments the need for continued testing seems unclear. The argument that continued testing will be needed to ensure the safety and reliability of a reduced nuclear stockpile seems to ignore the fact that reliability and safety requirements could be met without resorting to nuclear test explosions. These contradictions give rise to suspicions among those who perceive a need to produce nuclear weapons that vertical proliferation will continue. This is a blow to the international norm established and nurtured by the non-nuclear parties to the NPT. The difficulties of verifying a CTBT can no longer be invoked as a stumbling-block to the conclusion of a test ban. The United States-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear test limitations provide increasing confidence and prove that given the political will verification problems can be effectively negotiated. As a matter of fact, the United States and the USSR are reported to have made good progress in finalizing necessary verification measures for the threshold test-ban Treaty. The commonly held technical opinion is that technical difficulties in verifying a complete test ban will be much less burdensome than those associated with threshold verification now being finalized.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

Tangible progress in commencing negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban is clearly a step that will be commensurate with the positive developments that we see in the field of nuclear disarmament. Although a few countries hold a different opinion about a time frame for concluding a nuclear test ban, it is considered as a desirable objective by all. Even if we were to address verification issues, this has to be done in the context of a possible structure of a treaty. Initiating a process towards negotiations on that basis will not prejudge anything, as we all know that such negotiations cannot be concluded within a short period. Given the various dimensions of a CTBT it is undeniable that such a measure should be negotiated multilaterally. We eagerly await the outcome of Ambassador Donowaki's untiring efforts in this regard.

The overwhelming majority of parties to the partial test-ban Treaty have made use of the due legal process provided for in the Treaty to convert that instrument into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are gratified at the constructive dialogue that has taken place in this context among the parties, including the depositary Governments. Sri Lanka, being one of the initiators of the proposal, looks forward to a constructive amendment conference which could provide the necessary political impetus to find a way forward for the realization of the purposes enshrined in the partial test-ban Treaty.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another priority item on the CD's agenda. We believe that this is another area of multilateral endeavour which could benefit from the existing "psychosphere" that is promising and conducive. My delegation hopes to revert to this item in more detail at a later stage. We are pleased that the Ad hoc Committee on this subject has been established under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Shannon of Canada. However we had expected improvements to its mandate commensurate with constructive work that is possible. Outer space issues, particularly preventive measures against arms competition in that environment, have assumed greater importance as the use of outer space has become a truly multinational endeavour. Given the investments that continue to be made by an increasing number of countries in the use of outer space and its economic and security implications for all countries of the world, the need to keep outer space for the benefit of mankind remains a matter of urgency. Over three years, the Ad hoc Committee has accumulated a substantial amount of political, legal and technical expertise on the subject. We should now guide its work towards more focused consideration of common elements which could be further developed in terms of the Ad hoc Committee's mandate. Regrettably however the Committee has had a tendency to engage in cyclical debates in which a replay of positions has overwhelmed possible efforts to identify common ground. For too long, the Committee has debated merits and demerits of different segments of its work programme of past years. This we think is unnecessary and unproductive. This is all the more regrettable since it would have been possible for the Ad hoc Committee to focus on elements of common interest without prejudice to the position of any delegation with regard to an eventual agreement or agreements that could be reached. My delegation has long supported the formation of an expert group to help move this process of delineation forward. Irrespective of the form this expert contribution may

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

take, we look forward to the new ideas of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on this subject so that identification of common elements can be done in a way acceptable to all delegations.

There is a widely shared optimism that a convention banning chemical weapons is within reach. The energetic and imaginative leadership of Ambassador Morel last year made noteworthy contributions to pave the way towards that goal. We are confident that under the able and dynamic leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, the Ad hoc Committee will take decisive steps towards completing this task.

My delegation shares the view that most of the technical infrastructure of the convention is in place. Very useful work done last year on the annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures and the thorough and practical work on instrumentation has greatly contributed to this accomplishment. We are particularly pleased with the work on instrumentation ably chaired by the Finnish delegation. The outcome of this work indicated that the complex verification requirements of the convention could be expected to be met by the technological means available. We appreciate the initiative taken by Australia in bringing together private sector chemical industry and government representatives. It seems to us however that if we are to maintain the momentum generated by the Paris and Canberra conferences we have to take decisive steps towards completing the task without dampening the enthusiasm that has been aroused. The time has now come to address remaining issues in a political perspective with a view to arriving at speedy and lasting decisions through compromise, consultation and consensus. Ambassador Morel's cogent observations at the end of the Ad hoc Committee's session last year are still valid: "Our time is not infinite, and ... the convention now being finalized will produce practical results only if it is universal in its application." Technical competence alone will not facilitate the early conclusion of the convention.

We are inclined to believe that a time frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations. We therefore believe that a sense of timing should be infused into our negotiations in order to provide a proper framework for compromises. These efforts can take place parallel to the technical work that still has to be done in the working groups of the Ad hoc Committee. What must be avoided however is loss of focus in technical discussions risking reopening of the areas of agreement and convergence. The energetic efforts deployed by Ambassador Hyltenius to meet these challenges with a sense of realism give us hope and optimism.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

The key to the success of the future convention on chemical weapons will be its appeal to universal adherence. The other day the Group of 21 made unequivocally clear its commitment to a non-discriminatory convention embodying a comprehensive ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. With the political authority flowing from the Paris consensus, such a convention can and should command universal adherence on its own merits. My delegation believes that universal adherence could best be ensured not by tactical means but by making the convention attractive to all countries in terms of their security and related economic and political considerations. Compromises on remaining issues, we believe, are possible in a way that would promote this objective by preserving the multilateral character of this instrument in its broadest sense. It is therefore necessary now to make a renewed effort to tackle the outstanding political issues with a view to taking a decision. Any deflection of the time available to matters of which some could best be handled by a preparatory commission could only lead to a diffusion of focus and loss of momentum. My delegation therefore hopes that such a situation will be avoided and decisive steps will be taken towards the final phase of our negotiations.

Although not directly related to the CD, the fourth review conference of the NPT, scheduled to take place later this year, will be an event of relevance to our work. Sri Lanka, as a State party to the NPT, and one which took an active part in the third review conference, looks forward to a successful fourth review. We do so with the knowledge that non-nuclear States parties by their scrupulous compliance with the Treaty - a fact recorded by successive review conferences - have established an important international norm, not by words but by deeds. For the fourth review conference to be a successful one, the most important prerequisite would be the reaffirmation of the confidence of States parties to the Treaty that the NPT obligations have been honoured by all States parties and in all respects. Whilst we welcome the progress made in bilateral nuclear arms limitation efforts, we are disappointed that multilateral manifestations in that direction were not forthcoming. Tangible progress towards negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty and satisfactory solutions to legitimate demands from non-nuclear countries for security assurances against nuclear weapons would be of fundamental importance for continued confidence in the NPT and to ensure a successful review process. Non-nuclear countries have taken courageous political decisions in keeping with their security interests, to join the NPT and to honour faithfully the commitments thus undertaken despite conceptual anomalies inherent in that instrument.

The genesis of political compromises that led to the realization of the NPT would indicate that the longevity of the Treaty will progressively be tested through the passage of time and the implementation of the Treaty in all aspects. If multilateral work in the areas which I referred to earlier remain paralysed it would give rise to concerns about the viability and credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty particularly in an environment where the utility of nuclear weapons and their vertical proliferation continue to be expounded. This will also act as a barrier against much desired wider adherence to the NPT.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

In conclusion, it is time that we display the necessary political will to revitalize this body and enable it to discharge its vital and unique mandate. Our agenda is rich in content and potential. We of course can and must improve on it. As your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands, observed at the end of his presidency:

> "... the CD should take into account the exciting events which are occurring almost daily and which cannot leave our work in the CD unaffected. Indeed, the chances for a convergence of views and the conclusion of agreements concerning multilateral disarmament are greater than ever."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, I should like to extend to you my personal as well as my delegation's warmest felicitations on your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the current month and to assure you of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your important task. I should also like to take this opportunity to compliment your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the competent manner in which he guided us through the first stage of our spring session.

A number of colleagues have left us since the last time I addressed the Conference. May I take this opportunity to wish them every success in their future assignments.

The absence of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico from our midst will be felt particularly by all of us. His retirement after a long and distinguished career in the service of his country has left a void which will be difficult to fill. His work in the field of disarmament and his commitment to the furtherance of world peace has been recognized internationally. Don Alfonso has played a great innings and has earned a well deserved rest. My delegation and I take this opportunity to wish him a very happy retirement.

Since this is the first time I am taking the floor during the current session, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. My delegation looks forward to working in close co-operation with them in the months ahead.

My statement today will address some of the issues which we believe have gained in importance because of the changing realities on the world scene.

Our session this year starts on an auspicious note. The events of the last six months in Europe have given this continent a new look. The fabric of mutual distrust and hostility woven during the cold war years is being replaced by a spirit of dialogue and understanding. Fear of negotiation has given way to a bold and co-operative relationship between the super-Powers. Arms control negotiations appear to be making rapid progress, and the world

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community is expectantly waiting for some major breakthrough during the months ahead. The pace of developments has demonstrated that the reduction and eventual elimentation of nuclear and conventional forces is a realistic objective, that it can be achieved in a way which enhances the security of all concerned, and that when the requisite political will exists, problems of a technical nature do not present insurmountable obstacles.

However, for the sake of realism, we have to admit that in the world of today, agreements between the two super-Powers alone to limit their arsenals and reduce their force levels do not constitute a sufficient guarantee for peace and security. Similarly, we would be deluding ourselves were we to pretend that all conflicts in our world are attributable to East-West tensions. We cannot, and we should not, ignore the fact that peace and tranquillity is increasingly being endangered not by super-Power rivalries, but by the primitive impulses of many a newly emerging regional Power seeking to dominate its neighbours. It is surely paradoxical that while the two super-Powers are beginning to move towards reducing their stockpiles of lethal weapons under conditions of growing mutual accommodation and understanding, there are developing countries which are diverting more and more of their scarce resources in men and material to the production and acquisition of weapons.

We are fully convinced that in order to reinforce the structure of world peace and security, it is absolutely essential that the commitment to disarmament should be extended to the regional level as well. The removal of tensions and the elimination of conflicts from various regions of the world is a vital element in the search for international security. This can become possible through the equitable settlement of disputes and by the establishment of a military balance which ensures security at the lowest level of armaments. The former requires a clear desire on the part of the different parties, particularly the militarily more powerful States, to address the root causes of regional disputes without trying to bulldoze them under the carpet of oblivion. The latter would have to take into consideration not only the respective military capabilities, acquisitions from external sources, levels of sophistication of arms, and indigenous production facilities of the States involved, but also their histories of past tensions, and their fears and doubts about ambitions for regional hegemony. Measures to create a regional balance, in our view, play an important role in the creation of a climate of mutual trust and confidence, which is an important prerequisite for progress towards disarmament.

We feel that because of the importance of the regional dimension of disarmament, the item should be placed on our agenda for our consideration. As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, it is here in the CD that the question of regional disarmament ought to be addressed.

The expansion and modernization of naval forces by some States beyond the legitimate requirements of coastal defence has caused smaller States to feel insecure and threatened. This expansion, combined with increased sophistication of sea-based weapons systems, the deployment at sea of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, and the introduction of nuclear-powered

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

submarines in different regions of the world, has given an alarming capability to the navies of a few States. As a result of these developments, the security of the small and medium-sized coastal States is now threatened from the sea on a unprecedented scale. This question of naval disarmament and the placing of limits on the military uses of the high seas, therefore, also deserves to be addressed by the Conference on Disarmament. Measures which could be discussed under this head could include effective nuclear disarmament at sea, limitation of the blue-water forces of major naval Powers, and increased sea-front security for the small and medium-sized coastal States. The capability for overseas power projection should be severely restricted.

Even though we are concentrating all our energies on the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, a goal in which my delegation is duly participating, we cannot ignore the fact that the question of a nuclear test ban remains the most pressing item on our agenda. This is a reflection, in the first place, of the primary importance which the cessation of nuclear testing occupies within the process of nuclear disarmament, and secondly, of our failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban, despite years of discussion and debate in a variety of international forums. No other question in the field of disarmament, it has been rightly said, has been the subject of so much study and discussion. And yet the prospects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty appear today to be as bleak as they were in 1962.

During the latter half of the 1970s, we were informed that the trilateral negotiations then in progress between the signatories offered the best way forward and that multilateral negotiations would interfere with and complicate the trilateral talks. However, after 1980, the trilateral negotiations were not resumed and the working groups set up in 1982 and 1983 wound up in abstract discussion. Since 1984, it has not been possible to set up a subsidiary body on the subject because of the opposition of a group of States to giving it an appropriate mandate. It is unfortunate that the mandate question continues to frustrate efforts to set up an ad hoc committee empowered to exercise substantively all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban.

It is this frustration with the lack of progress in the Conference which has prompted more than 50 signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty to seek an amendment conference so as to convert it into a CTBT. We have heard arguments around this table that the appropriate forum to negotiate a test ban is the Conference on Disarmament, and that this objective cannot be achieved by convening an amendment conference. While we have no quarrel with the first argument we feel that countries which are sincerely interested in a test ban should use whatever means are available at their disposal to achieve their goal. If the initiative for an amendment conference is successful then it will have been well worth the effort.

Our discussions on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference are most relevant inasmuch as we feel that a review of our working methods, like that of any organization, should be a continuous process. We do not believe in change for the sake of change, but in view of the changing world situation there is a need to have another look at our agenda so that it properly reflects the priorities of the decade ahead of us.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

The Group of Seven has done some very useful work, and their deliberations have produced a wealth of ideas and suggestions. We would propose that the Group be revived and entrusted with the task of suggesting improvements in our existing structure.

We also support the early expansion of the CD by four members as was decided in 1983. However, with the changes in Europe still not completed, we should be very careful not to disturb the delicate political balance which is one of the essential prerequisites for the effective functioning of our Conference.

Opportunities for disarmament must not be missed. The widespread expectations raised as a result of the improvement in East-West relations should be complemented by measures to meet the challenges of our age. The question that confronts us today is whether we have the vision and courage to act in concert to ensure an era of peace and progress. The responsibility we face is heavy and we in the Conference on Disarmament should ensure that we do not condemn our future. We must rationalize our agenda so as to bring it into closer relevance with some of the grave problems facing us, and address it with a renewed resolve and a heightened sense of urgency. Given the political will and a constructive approach on the part of all its members there is no reason why the Conference on Disarmament cannot come up with a response commensurate with the historical proportions of the challenge that it faces.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of subsidiary bodies. It is, as usual, merely indicative and may be amended, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 27 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.546
27 March 1990

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 27 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ebeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 546th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Ambassador for Disarmament of Canada, Her Excellency Margaret Mason, who is at present following this plenary meeting. I wish Her Excellency a successful mission in Geneva, where she is consulting on various disarmament issues falling under her responsibility.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representative of Japan, Ambassador Donowaki, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Since this happens to be my first intervention at a plenary session of this Conference, allow me first of all to express my sincere appreciation for all the very warm words of welcome addressed to me to my senior colleagues around this table in this historic and magnificent conference room. As a newcomer, I pledge to do my best in co-operating with our colleagues and friends here in an endeavour to achieve higher goals in the field of arms control and disarmament.

May I also take this opportunity to join with preceding speakers in congratulating you, Mr. President, for the excellent leadership you are demonstrating in presiding over our work. At the beginning of this month, we had the pleasure of having the honourable Minister of External Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, His Excellency Dr. Luxman, address this Conference, and I felt proud about the great nation of Africa where I had the privilege of serving as Japanese Ambassador until recently. Foreign Minister Luxman reaffirmed in unequivocal terms Nigeria's willingness to abide by its commitment and dedication to the cause of peace and security of the world just as it has over the years. In particular, the reference made by the Minister to the abiding faith Nigeria has in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons deserves wide and serious attention, in view of the upcoming fourth review conference of the Treaty later this year.

Before moving on to the main subject of my intervention, I also wish to express appreciation to the previous Presidents of the Conference, Ambassadors Benhima of Morocco and Nagelkerke of the Netherlands, for the enormous contribution they made in helping all of us to start smoothly this year's session of the Conference. My delegation also wishes to extend a whole-hearted welcome to Ambassador Margaret Mason of Canada today.

Listening to a number of eminent speakers and colleagues who took the floor before me, I was very encouraged and pleased to find myself among those

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body begins to produce concrete achievements, at this historic juncture of unmatched opportunities for arms control and disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament may be regarded as an inadequate body in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it.

It is only right at this point to refer to the very inspiring speech made by our eminent, esteemed and beloved colleague from Brazil, Ambassador de Azambuja, at the very outset of our Conference this year. In his speech he eloquently but painfully pointed out our failure so far to produce concrete achievements while super-Power bilateral and European regional East-West disarmament negotiations are harvesting unexpectedly rewarding results. He asked how our Conference, which is both structurally and conceptually a child of the cold war, can adapt to the new times.

Indeed, if the East-West confrontation is to be transformed into a kind of co-operation which will no doubt contribute to the stability and peace of the world, it is obvious that the existing grouping set-up in our Conference is bound to become obsolete. How to adapt ourselves is certainly not an easy question, but it may be time for us to begin to address ourselves to this question. Meanwhile, as for the substance of our work - although this is not an answer to the question posed by our eminent Brazilian colleague - I should like to share with you a way of looking at the things taking place in our multilateral negotiating body.

The chemical weapons convention, after so many years' hard work in this forum, is approaching completetion, and Japan takes the strong view that this year should indeed become a critical year in settling remaining major substantive issues for negotiation, as was declared at the Canberra Conference last September.

When we reflect upon various factors which may have led us to the present fairly successful outlook, it should be noted that the sound progress of our negotiations owes much to the two successful meetings held to promote a total ban on chemical weapons, in Paris and Canberra. We should also pay due regard to the bold steps taken by the United States and the USSR in declaring their chemical weapons stocks, accepting the principle of on-site instrusive inspections as a means of verification, and, most recently, announcing their readiness to destroy the bulk of their stocks down to equal low levels, pending the adoption of the international convention. An agreement to this effect is expected to be signed at the United States-Soviet summit meeting in June this year.

My delegation also supports the strong appeal made by the United States to all CW-capable States to follow the United States and the USSR in declaring basic data concerning their CW stocks as early as possible, because by so doing in the spirit of more transparency and mutual confidence-building we should be able to better secure the universality and success of the CW convention.

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decade, which may belong to a new era, and our Conference on Disarmament may establish its position as a forum which, after a long period of inability to carry out its tasks, is now being activated to serve the requirements of the new times.

Allow me to make a few more observations on this very important negotiation we are engaged in as a matter of highest priority at this moment. Japan believes that it is time for us now to pay more attention to tackling the key issues of a political nature, renewing our political commitment to the elimination of chemical weapons. Then, for the remaining technical questions, active participation by experts from industrial and academic circles will serve as a lever for acceleration of the negotiation.

As one of the major chemical industry nations, Japan wishes to reiterate the importance of the verification régime with respect to non-production of chemical weapons. The verification of destruction may be over in 10 years after the entry into force of the convention, but the verification of non-production will last indefinitely and affect a far greater number of States. In this field, we are trying to create a truly epoch-making mechanism which may serve as a model for future disarmament conventions. In working out a verification régime for non-production, we will have to respond to the need to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes of this convention, and at the same time the requirement of keeping the cost of verification down to a reasonably low level. In order to work out such a régime of verification that would be reasonably effective and reliable, it is extremely important to try to have a fairly accurate picture of the chemical industry situation prior to the conclusion of this convention. From this point of view, Japan hopes that under the recently proposed system of "technical support" for the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, a data base on the chemical industry will be worked out as one of its activities. About one week ago, Japan presented the Ad hoc Committee with data on its chemical industry, and hopes that this will contribute to the deliberations by the Committee on such problems as the cost of verification, answers to article VI, production thresholds and so forth.

Furthermore, my delegation wishes to reaffirm Japan's hope that its technologies might make some contributions to the resolution of difficult problems related to the CW convention, such as that of effective verification. As an example of such efforts, my delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Conference to the United States-Japanese agreement reached in Washington on 7 March under which the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute will work together in an experiment to test the reliability of remotely monitored sensors which operate unattended for long periods of time.

Now I should like to address myself to another important subject of my intervention today. Many questions are asked as to the adequacy of the Conference on Disarmament in adapting itself to the requirements of the new times. As I suggested at the beginning of my speech, it may well be that the recent encouraging developments in the East-West relationship have made it

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possible for the Conference to achieve major breakthroughs in the CW negotiations. In that case, we should try hard to achieve other breakthroughs in other long-standing issues before the Conference, thus turning this forum into a real working body serving the requirements of the new times.

Of course, what I have in mind are the issues of nuclear disarmament. Our colleague from Peru, Ambassador de Rivero, was so right in his speech on 13 February at this plenary session in pointing out that the reactivation of the ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests would "give the work of the Conference political symmetry". With respect to both nuclear and chemical weapons the two super-Powers are the largest possessors, and their reduction and ultimate elimination, as well as non-proliferation, are matters of great importance today not only to the two super-Powers but also to the entire world community. Thus, multilateral negotiations are closely linked to bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, as in the case of chemical weapons, advance in the dialogue and a co-operative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in recent years have made it possible to achieve significant breakthroughs in their bilateral talks in the field of nuclear disarmament. Japan whole-heartedly welcomes these developments, and is convinced that they are bound to be reflected in multilateral negotiations here in this forum.

When we consider the question of nuclear disarmament, the major efforts currently being exerted fall into three areas, namely the reduction of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation of those weapons, and a nuclear test ban. These three areas are interrelated, and a good balance among them will always have to be kept in mind. In all three areas, this year is expected to become a critical year. In the area of reduction of nuclear weapons, a START agreement is expected to be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the area of non-proliferation, the fourth NPT review conference is scheduled to be held. In the area of a nuclear test ban, the protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties are expected to be signed at the coming summit meeting between the United States and Soviet Union.

It is under such circumstances that the role and usefulness of the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, is being questioned. There is no doubt that, by resuming substantial work on nuclear test ban issues, the Conference will be able to make a valuable contribution in working out the best possible multilateral approach to this question, which would complement bilateral efforts being made between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It was from this viewpoint that my delegation has actively taken part in an effort to re-establish the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. My predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, initiated a dialogue for this purpose when he was the President of the Conference for the month of March last year. In order to disentangle ourselves from the impasse of conflicting group positions, he consulted each delegation on an informal and individual basis.

As was announced by your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, at the

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presidency, you too kindly encouraged me to continue the efforts. I should like to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation for the kind words of encouragement and support extended to myself and to my predecessor by a number of delegates at the sessions of this Conference.

It was only with such continued support and warm understanding by my colleages around this conference room that we began to break new ground in our common endeavour to disentangle ourselves from an impasse. I was extremely encouraged to see that, on the 14th of this month, you, Mr. President, successfully conducted a presidential consultation by inviting all the group co-ordinators for agenda item 1, and confirming that all groups agreed, without prejudice to their preferred draft mandates, to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate embodied in document CD/863. China also stated that it supported this approach and expressed its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it is re-established. This new development indeed represents a major break-through, and confirms the readiness of the Conference to resume substantial work in the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1.

My delegation hopes that all groups and each delegation will continue to show as flexible and constructive an attitude as possible on this question, so that the Conference will be able to resume, as speedily as possible, substantial work on the agenda item. My delegation will spare no efforts in facilitating such a process by doing whatever is necessary, and in co-operation with all other delegations.

As for the handling of the work of the ad hoc committee to be established, my delegation wishes to stress the importance of avoiding a repetition of rhetorical and political rituals. The deliberation will have to be concrete and realistic. Japan also realizes that the peace and stability of the world will continue to be based on the balance of power and nuclear deterrence for the time being. As a member of the Western group of nations sharing common ideals and values, Japan feels that the only practical way to cessation of all nuclear tests lies in maintaining a balance of nuclear weapons at ever-lower levels, and gradually reducing all nuclear test explosions and bringing them under effective control. In other words, the approach to this question should be exclusively within the practical framework of a step-by-step approach.

Therefore, Japan welcomed and supported the joint statement made by the United States and the Soviet Union on 17 September 1987, in which a stage-by-stage approach to the nuclear test ban problem was announced. Japan strongly hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union, after the expected signature of the protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties at the coming summit meeting, will proceed to the next stage of negotiations in this field, and that the bilateral United States-USSR negotiations and the multilateral deliberations in this Conference will be closely interrelated and reinforce each other.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

putting its conceptual design of a modern international seismic data exchange system through a testing operation. I note with great satisfaction that the second phase of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2) has recently started, and hope that it will produce a number of successful and meaningful findings, which would contribute a great deal in formulating a reliable mechanism for detecting underground nuclear explosions. With a view to enhancing further the value of the GSE's work, I would like to call on those countries which have not yet done so to join this important experiment.

At the same time, we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about multiple facets of verification from a broader perspective and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE. I feel that by doing whatever is needed in our endeavour to work out a reliable and effective system of verification in the field of a nuclear test ban, the Conference on Disarmament will be carrying out the work most needed at this time of history full of promises and anxieties.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speaker inscribed for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

I wish to recall that, as provided for in the timetable for meetings to be held during the present week, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. in this conference room.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 29 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.